

## **Schnellrecherche der SFH-Länderanalyse vom 27. November 2015 zu Afghanistan: Verlobung und Heirat, Zwangsheirat, Schulbesuch von Mädchen, Wahlbeteiligung, Sicherheitslage in der Stadt Herat, psychische Krankheiten**

Fragen an die SFH-Länderanalyse:

- Wie verläuft eine Verlobungszeremonie/Heirat in Afghanistan in städtischen Gebieten wie Herat in der Regel ab? Ist es möglich, dass Eltern einer religiös-konservativen Familie ihre Töchter erst nach dem 20. Lebensjahr verheiraten?
- Was passiert, wenn man sich in Afghanistan einer Zwangsheirat widersetzt?
- Wie lange gehen Mädchen in Afghanistan in der Regel zur Schule? Belegen Berichte, dass sich im Jahr 2005 die Sicherheitslage in Herat verbessert hat und Kinder deswegen vermehrt die Schule besuchen konnten?
- Ist es unüblich, dass in Afghanistan eine religiöse Familie keine politische Meinung hat? Wie ist beispielsweise die Wahlbeteiligung in Herat? Kann es sein, dass sich Afghanen – wegen der Bedrohung durch die Taliban – eher von politischen Angelegenheiten distanzieren?
- Wie ist die aktuelle Sicherheitslage in der Stadt Herat?
- Ist es korrekt, dass in Afghanistan psychische Krankheiten ein Stigma sind und oft nicht als solche bezeichnet und auch nicht behandelt werden?

Die Informationen beruhen auf einer zeitlich begrenzten Recherche (Schnellrecherche) in öffentlich zugänglichen Dokumenten, die uns derzeit zur Verfügung stehen.

### **1 Verlobungs- und Hochzeitsbräuche in Afghanistan**

**Die meisten Eheschliessungen werden ohne Einverständnis oder gegen den Willen der Ehegattin oder des Ehegatten geschlossen.** Ein am 18. April 2013 erschie- nener Artikel der *Deutschen Welle* berichtet, dass laut islamischem Recht sowohl der Mann wie auch die Frau einer Heirat zustimmen müssen, damit diese gültig ist. In Afghanistan haben jedoch laut dieser Quelle Traditionen tendenziell Vorrang vor isla- mischem Recht. So entscheiden Eltern oft über die Zukunft ihrer Töchter, ohne sie nach ihrer Meinung zu fragen. Gemäss der in einem Bericht des *Max Planck Institute* vom Juli 2012 zitierten *Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission* werden 60 bis 80 Prozent der Eheschliessungen in Afghanistan ohne Zustimmung oder gegen den Willen der Ehegattin oder des Ehegatten geschlossen.

**Es gibt sehr viele unterschiedliche Verlobungs- und Heiratstraditionen in Afgha- nistan. Entscheidungen betreffend Eheschliessungen werden auch innerhalb ei- ner Familie von Kind zu Kind unterschiedlich getroffen.** Gemäss einem *Landinfo-*

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Länderbericht von 2011 pflegen die verschiedenen ethnischen Gruppen in Afghanistan unterschiedliche Verlobungs- und Heiratstraditionen. Diese Traditionen werden auch innerhalb der ethnischen Gruppen nicht einheitlich praktiziert. Unabhängig von der Gemeinschaft, Ethnie oder Region sind die meisten Ehen arrangiert, werden also auf der Basis einer Vereinbarung zwischen Familien oder Gruppen geschlossen. Inwieweit die Heiratenden selbst in den Verlobungsprozess involviert sind, variiert hingegen. Arrangierte Ehen in Afghanistan sind Teil eines komplexen Systems von Traditionen, Loyalitäten und Autoritäten. Die *Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit* (AREU) kommt in einem Bericht vom Februar 2009 zum Schluss, dass Entscheidungen betreffend Eheschliessungen von Familie zu Familie sowie auch von Kind zu Kind innerhalb einer Familie sehr unterschiedlich getroffen werden. Neben unzähligen anderen Faktoren haben nämlich auch individuelle Erfahrungen und Eigenschaften Einfluss («*individual experiences and characteristics*»). So können individuelle Personen mit ähnlichem demographischem Hintergrund durchaus recht verschiedene Ansichten haben, wie angemessen über eine Heirat entschieden und wie sie durchgeführt wird. Es können daher in Bezug auf Verlobungs- und Heiratstraditionen keine Verallgemeinerungen basierend auf Wohngebiet (ländlich oder städtisch), Bildungsniveau oder ökonomischer Situation gemacht werden.

**Beispielhafter Ablauf einer traditionellen afghanischen Verlobung und Eheschliessung.** Ein auf *IslamOnline* am 18. Juni 2008 erschienener Artikel (zitiert nach *RDC Ireland*, April 2015) beschreibt den Ablauf einer traditionellen afghanischen Verlobung, auch wenn wie bereits erwähnt viele verschiedene Traditionen existieren und der Verlobungs- und Eheschliessungsprozess sehr unterschiedlich ausfallen kann, auch innerhalb einer Familie. Gemäss dem *IslamOnline*-Artikel haben junge Männer und Frauen nur selten Gelegenheit, sich kennenzulernen. Laut *Max Planck Institute* (Juli 2012) wird die individuelle Suche nach einem Ehepartner oder einer Ehepartnerin als schändlich angesehen, besonders wenn diese Suche von einer Frau initiiert wird. Wenn ein Mann eine Frau aus einer unbekanntem Familie heiraten möchte, sammeln gemäss *IslamOnline* (18. Juni 2008) seine Eltern zuerst einige Informationen über diese und senden dann ein weibliches Familienmitglied oder eine weibliche Verwandte zu deren Haus, um gegebenenfalls die Heiratsabsichten offenzulegen. Dieser Konsultationsprozess, in dem die finanziellen Ausgaben für die Hochzeit sowie die auszutauschenden Geschenke bestimmt werden, ist gemäss *Max Planck Institute* (Juli 2012) normalerweise zeitraubend und schwierig. Wenn beide Seiten mit der Abmachung zufrieden sind, bestimmen sie *IslamOnline* (18. Juni 2008) das Datum der Bekanntgabe der Hochzeitsvereinbarung. Die Verlobung (in Dari: *Shereny khory* oder *Namzady*) ist der erste Schritt zur Formalisierung der Bindung. Der Vater des Bräutigams geht dazu in Begleitung von einigen Verwandten und Älteren an einem vereinbarten Datum mit einem Sack voll Süßigkeiten und Geschenken für die zukünftige Braut sowie Geld und Kleidern für Familienmitglieder zum Haus der Braut. Wieviel Zeit zwischen der Verlobung und der Hochzeit vergeht, hängt von verschiedenen Faktoren wie der finanziellen Lage des Bräutigams ab. Gemäss dem *Muslim Marriage Guide* (ohne Datum, zitiert nach *RDC Ireland*, April 2015) dauert eine traditionelle afghanische Hochzeit drei Tage, wobei die Zeremonie zwischen sechs Uhr abends und zwei Uhr morgens stattfindet. Die Zeremonie beginnt damit, dass sich Braut und Bräutigam in Gegenwart eines *Mullahs* (Priesters) gegenseitig das Ehegelübde aussprechen. Der *Mullah* liest Texte aus dem Koran und führt Braut und Bräutigam durch

die Zeremonie. Dieser Teil der Hochzeit findet im engen Familien- und Freundeskreis statt, während zum nächsten Teil, bei dem die Familie des Bräutigams Gastgeberin ist, eine grosse Zahl von Gästen eingeladen ist. In konservativen Familien feiern Frauen und Männer getrennt. Nach einem aufwendigen Abendessen werden Braut und Bräutigam mit Süssigkeiten und Blumen überschüttet, während sie durch den Mittelgang schreiten. Dazu wird ein Lied namens *Asta Burrow* («Gehe langsam») gespielt. Braut und Bräutigam nehmen auf einer erhöhten Bühne Platz. Es finden mehrere Rituale statt, und sie tauschen Ringe aus und schneiden den Hochzeitskuchen an. Am Morgen wird ein Frühstück serviert, und Braut und Bräutigam werden zum Hochzeitszimmer geleitet und allein gelassen.

**Die Höhe der Mitgift («*mahr*») und des Brautpreises («*walwar*») werden zwischen den Familien der Brautleute verhandelt.** Gemäss *Landinfo* (2011) und *Max Planck Institute* (2005) schreibt die afghanische Gesetzgebung vor, dass eine Frau, welche eine Ehe eingeht, Anrecht auf eine Mitgift (*mahr*) hat. Diese soll im alleinigen Besitz der Frau bleiben und ihr als Sicherheit dienen, falls der Ehemann stirbt oder die Scheidung verlangt. Auch das islamische Recht und die islamische Tradition sehen eine solche Mitgift vor. Im Koran gibt es jedoch keine Bestimmungen betreffend der Höhe der Mitgift oder wann diese bezahlt werden sollte. *Mahr* besteht normalerweise aus Geld oder Waren mit finanziellem Wert. Die meisten afghanischen Frauen, selbst gebildete Frauen, kennen ihr Recht auf eine Mitgift nicht. Der Brautpreis (*walwar*) ist gemäss *Landinfo* (2011) und *Max Planck Institute* (2005) hingegen der Preis, den die Familie der Braut als Kompensation dafür erhält, ihre Tochter aufgezogen zu haben. Seine Höhe hängt von der finanziellen Situation der involvierten Familie ab und fällt niedriger aus, wenn die beiden Familien nahe verwandt sind. Obwohl das Bezahlen eines Brautpreises gegen die islamische Religion verstösst – danach ist eine Frau kein Besitztum und kann nicht verkauft werden –, ist diese Praxis vor allem im ländlichen Afghanistan weitverbreitet. Brautpreisbeträge können sehr unterschiedlich und fast beliebig hoch sein. Laut *AREU* (2009) berichtete ein Mann aus einer eher gut situierten im ländlichen Herat lebenden Familie, dass er rund 160'000 Afghani von seinem Schwiegersohn erhalten habe. Ein in der Stadt Bamyán lebender Afghane nannte das Beispiel einer Familie, welche für ihre Schwiegertochter 60'000 Afghani ausgegeben hatte. Gemäss *Max Planck Institute* (2005) berichteten Mitglieder der *jirga* (traditionelle Versammlung) von Gardiz in der Provinz Paktia von *walwar*-Beträgen zwischen 95'000 und zwei Millionen Afghani. Besonders hoch sind diese Beträge, wenn es sich um die zweite, dritte oder vierte Ehefrau handelt. So zahlte ein Mann laut der *jirga*-Mitglieder von Gardiz für seine dritte Heirat vier Millionen Afghani.

**Über ein Viertel der afghanischen Frauen werden mit über 18 Jahren verheiratet.** Gemäss einem Bericht des *US Institute of Peace* vom 28. Mai 2014 schätzt das afghanische Gesundheitsministerium, dass 21 Prozent aller Frauen mit 15 Jahren und 53 Prozent bis zum Alter von 18 verheiratet werden. Demnach wären 26 Prozent der Frauen zum Zeitpunkt ihrer Heirat älter als 18 Jahre.

*Deutsche Welle*, 18. April 2013:

**«According to Islamic law, a man and woman should agree on a marriage for it to be valid. However, tradition tends to take priority in Afghanistan. Parents often decide upon their daughters' future without asking them for an opinion. Men, on**

the other hand, are generally able to reject their family's choice of bride and can even choose their own bride sometimes.» Quelle: Deutsche Welle, Afghan women escape marriage through suicide, 18. April 2013:

[www.dw.com/en/afghan-women-escape-marriage-through-suicide/a-16750044](http://www.dw.com/en/afghan-women-escape-marriage-through-suicide/a-16750044).

Max Planck Institute, Juli 2012:

«According to observations reported by national and international organisations, forced marriages do take place in Afghanistan. These are marriages of underage children, married by their parents or other persons, as well as marriages of adults, mostly women, against their free will and consent. **According to the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, 60-80% of the marriages in Afghanistan are concluded without the consent or against the will of one of the spouses.**» Quelle: Max Planck Institute, Max Planck Manual on Family Law in Afghanistan, Amended 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, Juli 2012, S. 32:

[www.mpipriv.de/files/pdf3/max\\_planck\\_manual\\_on\\_afghan\\_family\\_law\\_english.pdf](http://www.mpipriv.de/files/pdf3/max_planck_manual_on_afghan_family_law_english.pdf).

Landinfo, 19. Mai 2011:

«**The different ethnic groups in Afghanistan have diverse traditions concerning agreements on – and entry into – marriage. In addition, these traditions are not uniformly practised within the groups, and large local variations may occur. Irrespective of kinship group, ethnicity and geographical region, most of the marriages in Afghanistan are arranged, in the sense that they are entered into following an agreement between families/groups. The extent to which the parties themselves are involved in the process leading up to an agreement tends to vary. (...) The marriage contract is thus an agreement between two families and not a confirmation of an emotional relationship between two individuals. In Afghanistan, arranged marriages are part of a complex set of traditions, loyalties and authorities.**» Quelle: Landinfo Country of Origin Information Centre, Afghanistan: Marriage, 19. Mai 2011, S. 5:

[www.landinfo.no/asset/1852/1/1852\\_1.pdf](http://www.landinfo.no/asset/1852/1/1852_1.pdf).

AREU, Februar 2009:

«**A significant degree of diversity was found in the ways in which decisions are made about marriages from family to family as well as from sibling to sibling within individual families. With so many factors affecting how decisions are made about marriages and what the outcomes of those decisions are, this is not surprising. Within the context of a particular family, it is not only gender and generational dynamics that affect who is included in the decision-making process but also individual experiences and characteristics. A range of factors that are external to the family were found to affect the decision-making process, such as the economic and political situation at the time. It was also noted that individuals from very similar demographic backgrounds can have quite different perspectives on the appropriate way to decide about marriages and conduct them. Given that the factors leading individuals and families to make decisions in particular ways or to choose particular marriage practices are so diverse, generalisations based on gross demographic characteristics such residential location (rural or urban), education or**

**poverty levels cannot be made in relation to what causes people to make certain decisions about marriages in their families.**» Quelle: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), Decisions, Desires and Diversity: Marriage Practices in Afghanistan, Februar 2009, S. 62:  
[www.refworld.org/docid/4992cc722.html](http://www.refworld.org/docid/4992cc722.html).

US Institute of Peace, 28. Mai 2014:

«Many of the legal protections, however, have failed to translate into practice. Despite the ban on child marriage, **the Afghan Ministry of Public Health estimates that 21 percent of all women were married by age fifteen and another 53 percent by age eighteen...**» Quelle: US Institute of Peace, Sharia and Women's Rights in Afghanistan, 28. Mai 2014, p.2; in: RDC, Legal Aid Board: Country Marriage Pack; Afghanistan, April 2015, S. 14:  
[www.ecoi.net/file\\_upload/1930\\_1430824906\\_afghanistan-cmp-april-2015.pdf](http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1930_1430824906_afghanistan-cmp-april-2015.pdf).

IslamOnline, 18. Juni 2008:

«Marriage in the traditional Afghan culture has a deep-rooted process through which it treads step by step. **Rarely do young men and women have an opportunity to meet each other, and the to-be wife is usually chosen in a haste.** When a young man wants to marry a young lady who is from an unknown family, **first his parents do some kind of background check about her, trying to know more about her morals, beauty, and other family affairs. If they are contented with what they find, his parents will send a female family member or a relative to her house in order to understand, indirectly or directly, and would disclose the proposal, if the situation is favorable. This consultation process takes some time, and a date is usually fixed to announce the decision among the relatives, if both sides are satisfied with this deal.** (...)

**Shereny khory or Namzady (Dari for: engagement) is the first step to formalize the affinity. The groom's father, accompanied by some kinfolk and elders, comes to the bride's home in a prefixed date with bags of sweets and gifts for the to-be bride, some money and clothes to some family members.** After the food is served, the groom's father or a respected man from among the guests formally unveils the purpose for their coming and puts the demand as if the bride's father accepts his son 'as a servant of him.' (...)

**The duration between the engagement and the wedding depends on several factors, including the financial ability of the groom. Soon after the engagement, the groom's family provides some amount of money to the bride's to buy things — like clothes, carpets, dishes, and jewelry — for the bride.**» Quelle: IslamOnline, Afghan Muslim Wedding, 18. Juni 2008; in: RDC Ireland, Legal Aid Board: Country Marriage Pack; Afghanistan, April 2015, S. 2-3:  
[www.ecoi.net/file\\_upload/1930\\_1430824906\\_afghanistan-cmp-april-2015.pdf](http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1930_1430824906_afghanistan-cmp-april-2015.pdf).

Max Planck Institute, Juli 2012:

«5. Significance of engagement in the Afghan society

*The period of engagement provides an opportunity for the bride and the groom to get to know each other better and to decide whether they want to marry. However, in Afghanistan, **the parents traditionally arrange the engagement of their children. Individual search for a suitable spouse, especially on the part of the daughter, is generally considered a disgraceful act.** However, negotiations taking place between matchmaking and engagement are usually lengthy and difficult, during which not only **the expenditures for the wedding, i.e. walwar and mahr, but also the gifts which are to be exchanged will be determined. These negotiations are followed by an extravagant engagement festivity in which both families participate and are served tea and sweets or complete meals required for a celebration. The groom's family presents jewels and clothes to the future bride. From this time on, she may expect from her fiancé expensive gifts on every national or religious celebration, which are called ceydī, baratī, nūrūzī, etc.** These attitudes place heavy financial burdens on the future husband. This is particularly true when it concerns the engagement of a minor or when the fiancé needs time to collect the costs of the wedding. **The period of engagement may then last for several years causing double costs for both bride and groom, as presents and gifts have to be offered at every occasion.** Furthermore in many cases the difference of age between bride and groom widens.» Quelle: Max Planck Institute, Max Planck Manual on Family Law in Afghanistan, Amended 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, Juli 2012, S. 22-23:  
[www.mpipriv.de/files/pdf3/max\\_planck\\_manual\\_on\\_afghan\\_family\\_law\\_english.pdf](http://www.mpipriv.de/files/pdf3/max_planck_manual_on_afghan_family_law_english.pdf).*

Muslim Marriage Guide, ohne Datum:

**«The Afghan marriage customs demand that the festivities are spread over three days. The ceremonies are conducted between 6 p.m and 2 a.m. The ceremony begins with the bride and the groom exchanging vows in the presence of the mullah or priest. The priest will read sections from the Quran and direct the bride and the groom through the ceremony. This is a family event in which close family and friends participate. The next part of the wedding is similar to the western marriage reception. This is normally hosted by the groom's family and a large number of guests are invited to attend. In conservative Afghan families, the female and male guests are separated and entertained in exclusive areas. Lavish dinner is provided and after dinner, the bride and groom walk up the aisle as they are showered with sweets and flowers and a special song is played known as the Asta Burrow meaning "go slow". The bride and groom then seat themselves on a raised stage. The bride and groom then go through several rituals and also exchange rings and cut the wedding cake. In the morning, breakfast is served and the bride and groom are conducted to their wedding chamber and left alone.»**  
Quelle: Muslim Marriage Guide, The Engagement, Henna and Nikah in Afghan Marriage Customs: The Nikah or marriage ceremony in Afghan marriage Customs, ohne Datum, in: RDC Ireland, Legal Aid Board: Country Marriage Pack; Afghanistan, April 2015, S. 3:  
[www.ecoi.net/file\\_upload/1930\\_1430824906\\_afghanistan-cmp-april-2015.pdf](http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1930_1430824906_afghanistan-cmp-april-2015.pdf).

Max Planck Institute, 2005:

« b) Negotiations during khāstgarī

There are two major issues especially discussed during the marriage negotiations: the amount of dower (mahr) and the amount of the bride price (walwar).

(1) Dower (mahr)

The right to a dower is derived from Islamic law and enshrined in the AfgCC. **However, women often don't know about their right to mahr and its importance. When asked, even educated women holding official governmental positions didn't know whether they had a dower and how much it was. The heads of the Department of Women's Affairs, for example, confirmed that they themselves didn't know how much their dowers were. The situation in rural areas is even worse, since they don't even know that they have a right to dower.**

Women undervalue the mahr because they understand it as financial aid after divorce. Emphasising mahr would mean that divorce is an option for them. **To insist on the mahr during the marriage negotiations is considered wrong and diminishes the social prestige of a woman. When mahr negotiations take place, each party nominates a proxy to represent him. The couple itself does not negotiate the dower; their proxies bargain over the amount of the dower.**

There are two kinds of dowers, immediate (mahr mo'ağal) and deferred (mahr mowağal) dower. The immediate mahr is briefly mentioned because all the gifts, jewellery, clothes, and other expenses given during the engagement period are considered to be part of the immediate mahr. If such gifts and offerings did not take place, the immediate mahr may consist of an amount of money, an apartment, a piece of land, a car, or another valuable item payable to the bride. Once the amount of the immediate dower is set, the proxy negotiates the specific deferred dower that will be due at some point in the future. This can be divorce, but it can also be another time in the future. Normally no woman asks for her dower during marriage. After the parties have reached an agreement on the immediate and deferred dower, the details of the agreement will be included on the marriage certificate.

(2) Bride price (walwar)

In the past twenty years, one of the main issues during the khāstgarī negotiation is the issue of walwar, also called toyana, qalin, or shir baha, expressions used in different parts of Afghanistan. Walwar is widespread in the east and southeast, toyana in central Afghanistan, qalin in the north and northwest, and shir baha in western areas of Afghanistan. **Walwar is understood as a compensation for the family of the bride for having nursed the girl. The amount of walwar is not fixed and may vary according to the economic background of the bride's family. In some cases, for example where the prospective spouses are relatives or there are close relations between the families or where the parents of the bride are less traditional, the economic condition of the groom's family will also be considered.**

Generally, the following pattern can be seen: If the bride's family is rich, they will not ask for extra money; in educated families, the walwar also does not seem to be an issue. If the bride's family is poor, walwar will be the single most important issue during the negotiations. The walwar has become an important income for the bride's family.

**The practice of walwar is very strong in rural areas where education is lacking and people are illiterate and poor. (...)**

**The amount of walwar can be as high as imaginable. According to members of the jirga of Gardiz, the center of Paktia province, walwar can start from 95,000 Afghani (= US\$ 2,000) and reach 2,000,000 Afghani (= US\$ 40,000). The walwar will be higher when the man is already married and wants to conclude a second, third, or fourth marriage. According to a member of the Gardiz jirga, in one of the districts of Paktia a man paid the amount of 4,000,000 Afghani (= US\$ 80,000) for his third marriage. The amount can radically increase for a fourth marriage. The amount of the walwar will also vary according to the specific characteristics of the girl, such as virginity, beauty, education, and family standing. According to the AIHRC Kandahar Regional office, in some rural areas when walwar is not asked for or taken by the bride's family, the bride will not be as respected as girls in this family whose parents have been paid a walwar.» Quelle: Max Planck Institute, Family Structures and Family Law in Afghanistan: A Report of the Fact-Finding Mission to Afghanistan, January – March 2005, 2005, S. 12-13:**

[www.mpipriv.de/files/pdf3/mpi-report\\_on\\_family\\_structures\\_and\\_family\\_law\\_in\\_afghanistan.pdf](http://www.mpipriv.de/files/pdf3/mpi-report_on_family_structures_and_family_law_in_afghanistan.pdf).

Landinfo, 19. Mai 2011:

**«According to Afghan law, women who enter into marriage shall have a dowry (mahr). The dowry shall remain the woman's separate property and is provided as security in case the husband dies or requests divorce. The dowry concurs with Islamic law and tradition, but the Koran contains no instructions regarding the size of the dowry or when it should be paid. During the wedding ceremony, the mullah who performs the religious rites will ask the groom's father to state the size of the dowry (Hafizullah 2005). The dowry will normally consist of a sum of money or commodities with a financial value. If the marriage is documented in writing, the size of the dowry must be recorded. According to Max Planck Institute (MPI), the vast majority of Afghan women – even well educated women in the cities – are unfamiliar with the right to a dowry (MPI 2005). The bride price [walwar] is the sum which is paid to a woman's parents in return for the right to marry their daughter. It is perceived as compensation to the woman's family for having raised her. According to the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), the bride price is an accepted custom which is practised in large parts of the country. This is confirmed by MPI, which further claims that the tradition of paying bride price remains strong in rural Afghanistan, where it can constitute an important source of income for poor families. The bride price will vary according to the financial position of the family involved, and will often be smaller if the parties are closely related. (...) There is widespread agreement that the practice of paying a bride price contravenes Islam, since women are not the property of their families and cannot be "sold".» Quelle: Landinfo Country of Origin Information Centre, Afghanistan: Marriage, 19. Mai 2011, S. 7-8:**

[www.landinfo.no/asset/1852/1/1852\\_1.pdf](http://www.landinfo.no/asset/1852/1/1852_1.pdf).

AREU, Februar 2009:



«A very small number of parents mentioned spending the money they received as bride price on their daughters, such as the following **middle-aged man from a relatively economically comfortable family living in rural Herat**. He has four young daughters, one of whom was recently married, and he describes how he spent the bride price received for his daughter: **'I got around 160,000 Afs from my son-in-law, but spent all of that money on my daughter**. This is a tradition in the village that when the father gives his daughter to someone, he spends the bride price on his daughter. The father should buy all the house equipment like dishes, cooker, carpet, clothes, blankets, boxes and teapot.' (...) An extreme example of the way in which a family may see a new bride as intrinsically linked to her bride price was related by an older man speaking during a focus group discussion in Bamyan city: **'I know a family who spent 60,000 Afs on their daughter-in-law, and they used to call her by the name of "60,000 Afs"**.» Quelle: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), Decisions, Desires and Diversity: Marriage Practices in Afghanistan, Februar 2009, S. 46-48:  
[www.refworld.org/docid/4992cc722.html](http://www.refworld.org/docid/4992cc722.html).

## 2 Mögliche Folgen bei Widersetzung gegen eine Zwangsheirat

**Zwangsheirat.** Der Begriff Zwangsheirat umfasst gemäss einem Bericht von *Human Rights Watch* (HRW) vom 9. Dezember 2009 Situationen, in welchen Frauen oder Mädchen ohne ihr Einverständnis heiraten müssen. In diesem Kontext sind sie Drohungen oder Gewalt ausgesetzt, werden entführt oder durch informelle Streitschlichtungen ausgetauscht.

**Haftstrafen für «moralische Verbrechen» und «Ehrverlust».** Laut *Human Rights Watch* (21. Mai 2013) waren 95 Prozent aller inhaftierten Mädchen und 50 Prozent aller inhaftierten Frauen in Afghanistan für «moralische Verbrechen» («*moral crimes*») wie *zina* (aussereheliche sexuelle Beziehungen) angeklagt oder verurteilt. In vielen dieser Fälle war der einzige «Beweis» das Weglaufen («*running away*») der Frauen oder Mädchen, um häuslicher Gewalt oder Zwangsheirat zu entkommen. Da Weglaufen keine Straftat ist, wurden sie «versuchter *zina*» («*attempted zina*») beschuldigt. Laut dem *USDOS*-Bericht vom 25. Juni 2015 diskriminieren die Polizei, Strafverfolger und Richter Frauen in straf- und zivilrechtlichen Verfahren in Bezug auf Gewalt und Zwangsheirat. Gemäss einem Bericht des *Ireland Refugee Documentation Centre* (RDC) von 2014 verbüssen Frauen, welche ihre Männer verlassen haben oder sich weigerten, eine arrangierte Ehe einzugehen oder das Elternhaus für einen Mann ihrer Wahl verliessen – alles sogenannte «moralische Verbrechen» – Haftstrafen von bis zu sieben Jahren. Auch die Sonderberichterstatterin des UN-Menschenrechtsrates zeigte sich besorgt über die hohe Anzahl (428) für «moralische Verbrechen» («*moral crimes*») verhaftete, verurteilte und inhaftierte Frauen und Mädchen. In ihrem Bericht hielt sie fest, dass solche Verurteilungen oft aufgrund von wenigen Beweisen ausgesprochen und Untersuchungen nicht angemessen durchgeführt wurden (*UN Human Rights Council*, 12. Mai 2015). *Human Rights Watch* berichtete im März 2012 ebenfalls davon, dass Frauen und Mädchen, welche beschliessen, von zu Hause wegzugehen, oftmals von wütenden Eltern, Brüdern, Verlobten und Ehemännern aufgespürt und beschuldigt werden, davonzulaufen oder *zina* zu begehen im Wissen, dass die Betroffene aufgrund dieser Beschuldigungen wahrscheinlich verhaftet wird. Auch wenn die Anschuldigungen nicht bewiesen werden können und die Frau oder das Mädchen

einer Haftstrafe vielleicht sogar entgeht, sind ihre Glaubwürdigkeit und ihr Ruf dauerhaft beschädigt. Laut *Landinfo* (19. Mai 2011) werden Paare, die davonlaufen, oftmals inhaftiert. Der Mann wird der Entführung und die Frau der *zina* beschuldigt. Ein Richter verurteilte 2006 eine Frau zu 18 Monaten Gefängnis mit der Begründung, dass sie ausserehelichen Geschlechtsverkehr gehabt haben muss, da sie weggerannt ist. Die höhere Instanz hielt an diesem Urteil fest. Laut derselben Quelle ist eine aufgelöste Verlobung für eine Frau problematischer als für einen Mann und kann dazu führen, dass die Frau unverheiratet bleibt. In Afghanistan herrscht die Ansicht, dass eine Verlobung nicht aufgelöst wird, wenn die Frau und ihre Familie ehrbar sind. Im Umkehrschluss lässt eine aufgelöste Verlobung also für das gesellschaftliche Umfeld darauf schliessen, dass die Ehre der Frau verletzt sei. Laut *Max Planck Institute* (2005, zitiert in *Landinfo*, 19. Mai 2011) wird eine Frau nach Auflösung ihrer Verlobung ohne Gewissheit über ihre Zukunft und ohne die Achtung leben, die sie vor ihrer Verlobung genoss.

**«Ehrenmorde» an weggelaufenen Frauen sind weit verbreitet.** Gemäss dem Bericht des *UN Human Rights Council* vom 12. Mai 2015 hat die *Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission* zwischen 2011 und 2012 280 Fälle von Frauen registriert, welche von Familienmitgliedern getötet worden sind. Bei den meisten Fällen handelte es sich um Frauen oder Mädchen, die sich geweigert hatten, eine arrangierte Ehe einzugehen oder die bezichtigt wurden, eine von der Familie als unangemessen betrachtete Beziehung zu unterhalten. Viele Ermordungen werden kaschiert oder es werden andere Todesursachen angegeben. Laut RDC (Oktober 2014) und HRW (2015) verabschiedete das afghanische Parlament Anfang 2014 ein Gesetz zur Strafprozessordnung verabschiedet, welche die strafrechtliche Verfolgung von Tätern sogenannter «Ehrenmorde» verunmöglichen würde. Laut HRW (2015) nimmt auch die modifizierte und vom damaligen Präsidenten Hamid Karzai unterzeichnete Version des Gesetzes trotz einiger Verbesserungen viele Familienmitglieder davon aus, als Zeugen vorgeladen zu werden. Dies macht eine erfolgreiche Verfolgung von Tätern sogenannter «Ehrenmorde» sehr unwahrscheinlich. Von HRW (2012) interviewte Frauen, die weggelaufen sind, gaben an, dass Haftstrafen nicht die schlimmste Folge einer Verurteilung für «moralische Verbrechen» sind. Sie befürchteten, von ihren Ehemännern oder Familienmitgliedern umgebracht zu werden, sobald sie aus dem Gefängnis entlassen werden, was in Anbetracht der vielen Ehrenmorde in Afghanistan eine realistische Befürchtung ist (HRW, 28. März 2012). Die *New York Times* berichtete am 7. November 2010, dass zurückgekehrte Weggelaufene oft erschossen oder niedergestochen werden, weil ihre Familien befürchten, dass sie unbegleitet Zeit mit einem Mann verbracht haben.

**Inhaftierung als «Schutzmassnahme» wegen mangelnder staatlicher Schutzmöglichkeiten und unzureichender Schutz durch Frauenhäuser.** Gemäss USDOS (25. Juni 2015) wurden Frauen, für die es zu unsicher gewesen wäre, nach Hause zu gehen, inhaftiert, da keine geschützten Unterkünfte verfügbar waren. Laut einem Bericht des *Institute for War and Peace Reporting* vom 11. März 2015 existieren in ganz Afghanistan nur rund zwölf Schutzhäuser für Frauen, wobei diese keine rechtlichen Möglichkeiten haben die Frauen zu schützen. Auch das *Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women* (CEDAW) kritisierte im Juli 2013 die mangelnde Nachhaltigkeit der Frauenhäuser und ihre geringe Zahl. Laut HRW (28. März 2012) sind die wenigen existierenden privaten Frauenhäuser bei weitem nicht ausreichend.

Viele Frauen und Mädchen wissen nicht, dass diese Frauenhäuser existieren. Problematisch ist laut derselben Quelle auch, dass Frauen auf allen Ebenen des Rechtssystems gegenüber Vätern oder Ehemännern wegen ungeschriebener sozialer Regeln benachteiligt werden. Gemäss *UN Human Rights Council* (12. Mai 2015) müssen Organisationen, die direkt mit Opfern geschlechtsspezifischer Gewalt arbeiten, im Geheimen arbeiten, da sie auf viel Feindseligkeit stossen und die Opfer als Kriminelle betrachtet werden. Frauenhäuser würden oft als Institutionen angesehen, die Frauen dazu ermutigen, davonzulaufen und sich unmoralisch zu verhalten, oder auch als Bordelle. Weiter kritisiert der *UN Human Rights Council* die kleine Anzahl und die Fähigkeit dieser Häuser, den Frauen Schutz zu gewähren, sowie die mangelnden Kompetenzen des Personals und das Fehlen von Perspektiven zur langfristigen Reintegration und Unterstützung für die Opfer. Gemäss USDOS (25. Juni 2015) sollen das *Ministry of Women's Affairs*, welches alle von NGOs betriebenen Frauenhäuser unter seiner Kontrolle hat, sowie auch nichtstaatliche Institutionen versucht haben, Ehen für Frauen zu arrangieren, die nicht zur ihren Familien zurückkehren konnten.

HRW, 9. Dezember 2009:

*«Forced and child marriage in Afghanistan remain widespread and socially accepted. Though the data on prevalence varies, all surveys indicate that **well over half of all marriages are forced or involve girls under age 16. Forced marriage includes situations in which women and girls must marry without their consent, face threats or violence, are kidnapped, or are traded through informal dispute mechanisms, such as to settle a rape case, and when they are 15 or younger.**»* Quelle: Human Rights Watch, "We Have the Promises of the World": Women's Rights in Afghanistan, 9. Dezember 2009, S. 49:  
[www.hrw.org/report/2009/12/06/we-have-promises-world/womens-rights-afghanistan](http://www.hrw.org/report/2009/12/06/we-have-promises-world/womens-rights-afghanistan).

HRW, 21. Mai 2013:

*«In a March 2012 report, "I Had to Run Away": The Imprisonment of Women and Girls for 'Moral Crimes' in Afghanistan," **Human Rights Watch documented that some 95 percent of girls and 50 percent of women imprisoned in Afghanistan were accused of the "moral crimes" of "running away" from home or zina (sex outside of marriage).** These "moral crimes" usually involve **flight from unlawful forced marriages or domestic violence.** Women and girls imprisoned on "moral crimes" charges who were interviewed by Human Rights Watch described abuses including forced and underage marriage below age 16, beatings, stabbings, burnings, rapes, forced prostitution, kidnapping, and threats of "honor killing." Virtually none of the cases had led even to an investigation of the abuse, let alone prosecution or punishment.*

***"Running away," or fleeing home without permission, is not a crime under the Afghan criminal code, but the Afghan Supreme Court has instructed its judges to treat women and girls who flee as criminals. Zina is a crime under Afghan law, punishable by up to 15 years in prison.** Some women and girls have been convicted of zina after being raped or forced into prostitution. Prosecution of women who are survivors of gender-based violence has continued, and many abusers of women have continued to go free in spite of Afghanistan's 2009 Law on the Elimination of Violence*

Against Women (EVAW Law), which created new criminal penalties for abuse of women.

While several high-level Afghan government officials, including from the police and Justice Ministry, have in the past year publicly confirmed that **“running away” is not a crime under Afghan law**, such statements have yet to translate into policy, Human Rights Watch said. Some legal experts have suggested that **a growing view that women and girls should not be charged with “running away” has merely resulted in a shift toward charging them with attempted zina. A charge of attempted zina unjustifiably assumes that women outside of the supervision of their male relatives must have attempted to have sex.**» Quelle: Human Rights Watch, Afghanistan: Surge in Women Jailed for ‘Moral Crimes’, 21. Mai 2013:  
[www.hrw.org/news/2013/05/21/afghanistan-surge-women-jailed-moral-crimes](http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/05/21/afghanistan-surge-women-jailed-moral-crimes).

USDOS, 25. Juni 2015:

**«In some cases authorities imprisoned women who had left home because it was unsafe for them to return home and there was no shelter available elsewhere. (...) Women in need of shelter but who could not find it often ended up in prison, either due to a lack of shelter alternatives, for their own protection, or based on local interpretation of “running away” as a moral crime. Adultery, fornication, and kidnapping are crimes under the law. Women often were convicted of those crimes in situations of abuse, rape, or forced marriage, or on the basis of invalid evidence, including flawed virginity tests. Running away is not a crime under the law. As of July 31, approximately 58 percent of female prisoners were incarcerated for moral crimes, according to GDPDC records, a decrease from 80.5 percent in 2013. The decrease was likely a result of a March presidential decree releasing women convicted of moral crimes. (...) The Ministry of Women’s Affairs regulates all shelters operated by NGOs. There were reports the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, as well as nongovernmental entities, sought to arrange marriages for women who could not return to their families. (...) Police, prosecutors, and judges discriminated against women in criminal and civil legal proceedings stemming from violence and forced marriages.»** Quelle: US Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2014, Afghanistan, 25. Juni 2015, S. 9, 42-45:  
[www.state.gov/documents/organization/236844.pdf](http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/236844.pdf).

Ireland Refugee Documentation Centre (RDC), Oktober 2014:

**«While “running away” is not a crime under Afghan law, law enforcement authorities often arrest, jail and even prosecute girls for running away, usually qualifying the charge as “intention” to commit zina (sexual intercourse outside of marriage). An Associated Press report on women imprisoned in Badam Bagh, Afghanistan’s central women’s prison, states: “The majority of the women packed are serving sentences of up to seven years for leaving their husbands, refusing to accept a marriage arranged by their parents, or choosing to leave their parent’s home with a man of their choice – all so-called ‘moral’ crimes.”»** Quelle: Ireland Refugee Documentation Centre, The Researcher, October 2014, Volume 9 Issue 2, Oktober 2014, S. 17:  
[www.refworld.org/docid/544a6db84.html](http://www.refworld.org/docid/544a6db84.html).

UN Human Rights Council, 12. Mai 2015:

«23. **During her visits to the Badam Bagh women's prison in Kabul and the juvenile rehabilitation centre in Herat, the Special Rapporteur expressed serious concern at the high number of women and girls arrested, prosecuted and imprisoned for so-called "moral crimes", including adultery and premarital sex. Interlocutors stated that such convictions were often made on the basis of minimal evidence of wrongful behaviour and that investigations were often not properly carried out. Of the 744 female prisoners across the country, 428 — or 58 per cent — were charged with so-called "moral crimes".**» Quelle: UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Addendum: Mission to Afghanistan, 12. Mai 2015, S. 7:  
[www.refworld.org/docid/5583f8224.html](http://www.refworld.org/docid/5583f8224.html).

HRW, 28. März 2012:

«While accurate statistics do not appear to be publicly available, **Human Rights Watch estimates based on prior studies and our work in three prisons in late 2011, that in January 2012 there were approximately 400 women and girls imprisoned in Afghanistan for "moral crimes."** These consist of **about half of all women (non-juveniles) in Afghanistan's prisons and virtually all teenage girls in its juvenile detention facilities.** Abuses against women and girls accused of "moral crimes" affect not only the hundreds of women and girls arrested each year, but also every woman and girl in Afghanistan who faces forced or underage marriage, domestic violence, or other abuse. **Imprisoning women and girls for trying to escape abuse sends a clear message to others: do not flee a dangerous home life or look for help outside the home, because when you seek protection or justice you may well face punishment instead. (...)** **When women and girls decide to leave because of abusive relationships or unhappiness, enraged parents, brothers, fiancés, and husbands frequently track them down and accuse them of running away or of zina.** Male family members, comfortable in **the knowledge that their own criminal behavior will not be subject to scrutiny, can easily use such accusations as a weapon. Aided by authorities too willing to accept their allegations at face value, they can accuse a woman of zina, knowing that she is likely to be arrested.** When this happens, women **often suffer an invasive medical examination and severe damage to their credibility and reputation, even if charges are never proven.** Even the threat of an accusation can be used to control women and cover up or justify crimes, including forced and underage marriage, rape, assault, and forced prostitution.» Quelle: Human Rights Watch, "I Had To Run Away" The Imprisonment of Women and Girls for "Moral Crimes" in Afghanistan, 28. März 2012, S. 3-4:  
[www.refworld.org/docid/4f787d142.html](http://www.refworld.org/docid/4f787d142.html).

Landinfo, 19. Mai 2011:

«The report *Economic and Social Rights Report in Afghanistan-III* from AIHRC points out the following: **'Couples who run away from home to get married are often imprisoned; the man is charged with kidnapping and the woman with zina. This is in contradiction to Article 425 of the 1976 Penal Code of Afghanistan. Criminal charges**

against women who run away from their homes to avoid forced marriage are of particular concern for the protection of the family. **The majority of these cases are ruled using traditional practices that are at times in contradiction with civil law. For example, Farina, a 19-year-old woman from Samangan ran away from home in late 2006 to get married with the man she liked. The police found and arrested them. The judge ruled that because she ran away she must have had pre-marital sex and sentenced both to 18 months in jail. The couple was not allowed to get married. The case came to the attention of the AIHRC early in 2007; despite the intervention, the higher court refused to overturn the initial decision.**» Quelle: Landinfo Country of Origin Information Centre, Afghanistan: Marriage, 19. Mai 2011, S. 17-18:

[www.landinfo.no/asset/1852/1/1852\\_1.pdf](http://www.landinfo.no/asset/1852/1/1852_1.pdf).

Landinfo, 19. Mai 2011:

«Even though the law allows for annulment of marriage agreements, this occurs only rarely. In general, a **broken engagement will be more problematic for a woman than for a man, and implies a risk that the woman will remain unmarried.** A man, on the other hand, can relatively easily become engaged again. **Afghans are of the opinion that if a woman and her family are honourable, an engagement will not be broken.** The German Max Planck Institute (MPI) describes the consequences of a broken engagement for a woman in the following manner: **'She will not be seen as she was before her engagement; she will now be without any assurance of her future and without the esteem that she held prior to her first engagement (MPI 2005).'**» Quelle: Landinfo Country of Origin Information Centre, Afghanistan: Marriage, 19. Mai 2011, S. 5-6:

[www.landinfo.no/asset/1852/1/1852\\_1.pdf](http://www.landinfo.no/asset/1852/1/1852_1.pdf).

UN Human Rights Council, 12. Mai 2015:

« 17. The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission registered more than **280 women who had been killed by family members during 2011 and 2012. Most of these killings had been carried out on women and girls who had refused to enter into an arranged marriage or had been accused of having a relationship that the family considered to be inappropriate. Given the sensitivities surrounding this phenomenon, many of the cases are concealed, and other explanations are provided for the deaths.**» Quelle: HRC - UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Rashida Manjoo; Addendum; Mission to Afghanistan [A/HRC/29/27/Add.3], 12. Mai 2015: [www.ecoi.net/file\\_upload/1930\\_1433945982\\_a-hrc-29-27-add-3-eng.doc](http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1930_1433945982_a-hrc-29-27-add-3-eng.doc).

RDC, 2. Oktober 2014:

«**Furthermore, in February 2014 the Afghan parliament passed a new law which would make it impossible to prosecute the perpetrators of such so-called "honour killings".**» Quelle: Ireland Refugee Documentation Centre, The Researcher, October 2014, Volume 9 Issue 2, Oktober 2014, S. 17:

[www.refworld.org/docid/544a6db84.html](http://www.refworld.org/docid/544a6db84.html).

HRW, 2015:

«Women's Rights

*Women's rights remained under threat in 2014. In January, a provision in Afghanistan's draft criminal procedure code became the latest in a series of attempts to roll back the already fragile legal protections for women and girls. **As passed by parliament, article 26 of the draft code included "relatives of the accused," among a list of people who "cannot be questioned as witnesses" in criminal proceedings, thereby making successful prosecutions of those committing domestic violence extremely unlikely. In late February, President Hamid Karzai signed the law but amended article 26 by decree to state that relatives of the accused are permitted to testify voluntarily. It also allows compelled testimony from any "complainant or informant regarding the crime" and slightly narrows the definition of "relatives." However, the amended article still exempts many family members from being called as witnesses.***» Quelle: HRW, World Report 2015: Afghanistan, 2015: [www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/afghanistan](http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/afghanistan).

HRW, 28. März 2012:

*«For some women whom Human Rights Watch interviewed, prison time is not even the worst consequence of their being charged with "moral crimes." Many women and girls who left their homes said they fear their husbands or family members will kill them for having "shamed" their families when they eventually are released from prison, a fear justified by the frequency with which "honor killings" occur in Afghanistan.»* Quelle: Human Rights Watch, "I Had To Run Away" The Imprisonment of Women and Girls for "Moral Crimes" in Afghanistan, 28. März 2012, S. 6: [www.refworld.org/docid/4f787d142.html](http://www.refworld.org/docid/4f787d142.html).

New York Times, 7. November 2010:

*«Returned runaways are often shot or stabbed in honor killings because the families fear they have spent time unchaperoned with a man. Women and girls are still stoned to death.»* Quelle: New York Times, For Afghan Wives, a Desperate, Fiery Way Out, 7. November 2010: [www.nytimes.com/2010/11/08/world/asia/08burn.html](http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/08/world/asia/08burn.html).

Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 11. März 2015:

*«There are only a dozen or so shelters across Afghanistan, including one in Kapisa province in the northeast. Saifora, who heads the provincial department for women's affairs, says that while such refuges do not have legal powers to protect those who come there, the fact that they exist and that their doors are open offers hope to the victims of sexual and domestic violence.*

*Maulavi Abdullah Abid, the provincial government's head of religious affairs, agreed that shelters were **an essential resource for women who could not access the justice system.** The argued that compassion was highly valued in Islam. **These safe***

**houses provided a resource for those women who were otherwise unable to access justice, and the principle of humanity behind them was an Islamic value.»**

Quelle: Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Safe Houses for Afghan Women, 11. März 2015:

[www.refworld.org/docid/5502b36e213.html](http://www.refworld.org/docid/5502b36e213.html).

CEDAW, 30. Juli 2013:

**«The Committee is concerned about the sustainability of the shelters for women victims of violence and about the need to increase their number.»** Quelle: Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Concluding observations on the combined initial and second periodic reports of Afghanistan, 30. Juli 2013: [http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/\\_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CEDAW%2fC%2fAFG%2fCO%2f1-2&Lang=en](http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CEDAW%2fC%2fAFG%2fCO%2f1-2&Lang=en).

UN Human Rights Council, 12. Mai 2015:

**«The organizations working directly with victims of gender-based violence have to operate in secrecy, as they are viewed with hostility and victims are often perceived as criminals. For example, shelters are viewed by many as institutions that encourage women to leave home; to behave immorally and outside of what is traditionally considered “acceptable” in a conservative and religious society; or as prostitution houses; or establishments that are causing the break-up of families. Thus both the service providers and those seeking protection are stigmatized and shunned by society. (...) There are also concerns regarding the ability of shelters to provide protection, the management abilities of staff and the long-term reintegration and support that is provided to women. Unfortunately, some shelters have also been used in the past for pretrial detention, owing to the lack of female pretrial facilities. (...) As regards protection mechanisms, the main challenges include the insufficient number of shelters and safe houses for women who are victims of violence and the lack of opportunities for women to be reintegrated back into their families and society.»** Quelle: UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Addendum : Mission to Afghanistan, 12. Mai 2015, S. 13-18: [www.refworld.org/docid/5583f8224.html](http://www.refworld.org/docid/5583f8224.html).

HRW, 28. März 2012:

**«With donor funding and government support, a small number of private shelters have been set up in about half the regions of the country to protect women fleeing violence and forced marriage. However, such measures are for the most part inadequate. Women and girls are often not aware that shelters exist, and those that do operate are too few in number and cannot protect a woman who has been accused of a crime. Moreover, bias is rife against women and girls at every stage of the justice system, with many officials enforcing unwritten social norms, rather than protecting women from abuse. All too often, police comply with fathers or husbands, like Homa's, who contact police to have fleeing wives or daughters arrested, assuming that if a man complains about a woman or she is outside the home**



*without permission, she is “bad” and guilty of immorality. In some alleged “moral crimes” cases, police have arrested women or girls while they took refuge in shelters. (...) **The Supreme Court of Afghanistan** has formally endorsed this discrimination by publicly instructing the country’s judges to treat “running away” as a crime, despite the absence of this offense in Afghan statutory law. The court states that rather than running away if they have problems at home, women and girls should seek government help. As this report shows, this is an unsafe and unfeasible option for most women and girls: they have no reason to be confident that police, judicial institutions, and government agencies will come to their assistance if they seek help. On the contrary, many women and girls we interviewed were further victimized after seeking help from these institutions.*

*Guarded shelters, operated by brave Afghan nongovernmental organizations, are the only option for some of these women and girls to stay alive, but such shelters exist only in less conservative parts of the country and face threats from opponents who describe them as “brothels” and seek to have them closed.» Quelle: Human Rights Watch, "I Had To Run Away" The Imprisonment of Women and Girls for "Moral Crimes" in Afghanistan, 28. März 2012, S. 4-5: [www.refworld.org/docid/4f787d142.html](http://www.refworld.org/docid/4f787d142.html).*

### 3 Schulbesuch

**Trotz obligatorischer Schulzeit gehen viele Kinder nicht in die Schule oder verlassen diese frühzeitig.** Laut *UK Home Office* (2005) anerkennt die 2004 verabschiedete afghanische Verfassung das Recht aller Bürgerinnen und Bürger Afghanistans auf Bildung. In Anbetracht dessen, dass das Bildungssystem 2001 am Boden lag, könnten allerdings keine sehr schnellen Veränderungen erwartet werden. Gemäss dem USDOS-Bericht vom 25. Juni 2015 ist der Schulbesuch in Afghanistan bis zur Sekundarstufe obligatorisch (sechs Jahre Primarschule und drei Jahre untere Sekundarstufe). Viele Kinder besuchen die Schule jedoch nicht. Sechs Millionen Kinder würden laut dieser Quelle stattdessen arbeiten.

**Schulbesuch von Mädchen.** Laut USDOS (25. Juni 2015) schätzt das *afghanische Bildungsministerium*, dass 39 Prozent der 8,2 Millionen Schulkinder Mädchen sind. Neben den nicht eingeschriebenen Kindern verlassen viele die Schule frühzeitig. Dieselbe Quelle verweist auf einen UNESCO-Bericht von 2012, der schätzt, dass doppelt so viele Jungen wie Mädchen die Sekundarstufe und viermal so viele Jungen wie Mädchen das tertiäre Bildungsniveau erreichen. Haupthindernisse, die dem Schulbesuch von Mädchen entgegenstehen, sind Armut, Früh- und Zwangsheirat, Unsicherheit, fehlende familiäre Unterstützung sowie zu wenige Lehrerinnen und lange Schulwege. Laut *Oxfam* (24. Februar 2011) besuchten im Jahr 2000 unter der Herrschaft der Taliban nur 5'000 Mädchen eine Schule. Sehr viele Mädchen verpassten gemäss *UK Home Office* (2005) bis zu sieben Jahre Schule und mussten sich in Klassen mit viel jüngeren Kindern einschreiben. Gemäss *IRIN* (2005) begannen Mädchen nach den internationalen Angriffen auf die Taliban 2001 langsam wieder den Schulbesuch aufzunehmen. Im Jahr 2004 gingen 50 Prozent aller Mädchen in den grossen Städten wie Kabul, Herat, Mazar-e Sharif und Badakshan zur Schule. Laut *Oxfam* (24. Februar 2011) waren im Jahr 2009 dank der *Back to School*-Kampagne 6.7 Millionen Mädchen

für den Schulbesuch eingeschrieben. Allerdings bedeutet die Einschreibung laut derselben Quelle nicht automatisch auch Schulbesuch. Schülerinnen und Schüler können offiziell für bis zu drei Jahre eingeschrieben bleiben, auch wenn sie als permanent abwesend («*permanently absent*») eingestuft sind. *Al Jazeera* berichtete am 13. Juli 2012 über eine Mädchenschule im Distrikt Pashtun Zargun, der in der Provinz Herat östlich der Stadt Herat liegt. Diese Mädchenschule sei überfüllt, und Eltern, die selbst mangels Schulen keine Schulbildung bekamen, schicken ihre Töchter nun in die Schule. Allerdings gebe es immer noch kulturelle Ressentiments gegen den Schulbesuch von Mädchen. Bereits vor der Talibanherrschaft schloss nur eine einzige Frau in Pashtun Zargun – in den 1960er Jahren – die Schule ab. So sprechen sich immer noch einige Älteste dagegen aus, dass Mädchen die Schule besuchen. Die meisten Eltern nehmen ihre Töchter denn auch aus der Schule, sobald sie die Pubertät erreichen, ungefähr im Alter von 14 Jahren. Nur wenige Mädchen können daher die Schule abschliessen.

**Immer wieder Angriffe auf Schulmädchen.** Immer wieder gibt es Berichte von Angriffen auf Schulmädchen. *Reliefweb* berichtete am 6. Juli 2015 von einem Säureangriff auf drei Schulmädchen in Herat. Schulbehörden zeigen sich besorgt über die hohe Anzahl von Bedrohungen gegen Mädchen, die die Schule besuchen.

**Verbesserung der Frauenrechte in Herat in 2005.** Gemäss einer von HRW (17. August 2005) befragten Frauenrechtsaktivistin führte die Absetzung von Herats Gouverneur Ismael Khan 2005 zu einer deutlichen Verbesserung der Frauenrechte in Herat. Im Rahmen dieser Recherche konnten keine Informationen gefunden werden, ob, und wenn ja, welche Auswirkungen diese Entwicklung auf den Schulbesuch von Mädchen in der Stadt Herat hatte.

USDOS, 25. Juni 2015:

**«Education is mandatory up to the secondary level (six years for primary school and three years for lower secondary), and the law provides for free education up to and including the college level. Many children, however, did not attend school. According to the AIHRC, six million children worked instead of attending school. In most regions boys and girls attended primary classes together but were separated for intermediate and secondary education. Of the country's 8.2 million school children, the Ministry of Education estimated 3.2 million, or 39 percent, were girls. Many students, however, were not enrolled full time or dropped out early. A 2012 UNESCO report estimated boys outnumbered girls by a ratio of two-to-one at the secondary level and four-to-one at the tertiary level. The status of girls and women in education remained a matter of grave concern. Key obstacles to girls' education included poverty, early and forced marriage, insecurity, lack of family support, lack of female teachers, and the long distance to school.»** Quelle: US Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2014, Afghanistan, 25. Juni 2015, S. 46-47:

[www.state.gov/documents/organization/236844.pdf](http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/236844.pdf).

HRW, 17. August 2005:

«**One women's rights activist and civic educator talked about the greater freedoms that women in Herat have enjoyed since the removal of Ismael Khan, one of Afghanistan's most powerful warlords, as governor of the western region.** She said, "Women can go to the market. Women can work in different offices, there were threats before. Women...are not threatened like before, before there were problems or threats if you wanted to make an international trip, now women are freely traveling. **Very, very positive changes have occurred**" Quelle: Human Rights Watch (HRW), Campaigning Against Fear: Women's Participation in Afghanistan's 2005 Elections, 17. August 2005. S. – Attachment 85:  
[www.hrw.org/legacy/background/wrd/afghanistan0805/](http://www.hrw.org/legacy/background/wrd/afghanistan0805/).

UK Home Office, 1. April 2005:

«**The Constitution adopted in January 2004 recognised that education is the right of all citizens of Afghanistan.** [81b] The Human Rights Research and Advocacy Consortium reported in March 2004 that, "**In the newly adopted constitution education for all is free and compulsory until 9th grade.** This is an ambitious and commendable target, but one that requires strategic and long term resource allocation, yet most donors only provide funding on a one year basis. "**There are no quick fixes in education. The education system was on its knees in 2001. It will take sustained support to ensure that all Afghan children can enjoy a quality education**" says Sally Austin, Care." (...) **A significant number of girls missed up to seven years of schooling during the Taliban era and, as a consequence, had to enroll in classes with younger children, which often discouraged them from attending school at all.** To provide this group of students with "catch-up" classes, in the winter of 2004, UNICEF and the Ministry of Education managed an accelerated learning programme in five provinces. More than 45,000 children, over 80 per cent of them girls, benefited from these accelerated classes...» Quelle: United Kingdom Home Office, UK Home Office Immigration and Nationality Directorate Country Report – Afghanistan, 1. April 2005:  
[www.refworld.org/docid/429ed11b4.html](http://www.refworld.org/docid/429ed11b4.html).

IRIN, 14. März 2005:

«**But there are big regional differences in attendance levels. In major cities like Kabul, Herat, Mazar-e Sharif and Badakshan, the situation is better, with about 50 percent of girls going to schools in 2004, the MoE said.** The repressive Taliban regime, which came to power in 1996, banned the education of girls. They **began to trickle back to classrooms only after the US-supported Northern Alliance (NA) ousted the regime in 2001.** (...) Despite significant progress having been made since then, UNICEF said that the main impediments to girls at school **included resource issues, like a lack of female teachers and inadequate school facilities, along with some socio-cultural factors hampering the process. But there are signs of change.** Mohammad, 33, a driver in Kabul, told IRIN that most of the girls in his village not far from the capital could not go to school several years ago as there were no education facilities in the district. "But there has now been a school in the village for a couple of years and most of the girls go there, including my two school-age daughters," he said, adding that the majority of parents in his village were positive about the idea of having girls educated. "**Our country had been at war for more than 20 years and**

*there was no education, people's minds became greatly affected by the years of war. In order to change this, people need education," he maintained.*» Quelle: IRIN, Afghanistan: New campaign to encourage girls into school, 14. März 2005: [www.irinnews.org/report/28323/afghanistan-new-campaign-to-encourage-girls-into-school](http://www.irinnews.org/report/28323/afghanistan-new-campaign-to-encourage-girls-into-school).

Oxfam, 24. Februar 2011:

*«Female education has faced significant obstacles in Afghanistan, yet there have been enormous gains since 2001. Under the Taliban, the majority of girls' schools were closed and gross enrollment fell from 32% to just 6.4%.<sup>1</sup> In the early years after the fall of the Taliban, education was a top priority for the Afghan government and donors. Much of this donor focus was on getting children back into school, with a particular emphasis on primary level. **The Back to School campaign, launched in 2002, significantly expanded enrollment, which has increased nearly seven-fold, from approximately 900,000 in 2000 to 6.7 million in 2009.<sup>2</sup> For girls, the increase has been even more dramatic: official enrollment figures have increased from an estimated 5,000 under the Taliban to 2.4 million girls currently enrolled.<sup>3</sup> Many of the girls enrolled through the Back to School campaign are now completing primary school. Yet beginning in 2006, efforts to improve education in Afghanistan began to slow down. Nearly five years on, those efforts have nearly run out of steam. A new approach from both the Afghan government and donors is urgently required to hold onto the gains that have been made. (...)***

*MoE data indicates that **there is also a significant gap between enrollment and actual attendance, suggesting that far fewer than the 2.4 million girls enrolled in school regularly attend classes.** MoE data shows that 19% of all enrolled children are classified as either temporarily absent, absent for most or all of the year, or "permanently absent." **MoE policy allows students classified as "permanently absent" to stay on school enrollment lists for up to three years without those students having attended school during that time.** In 2009, 22%, or approximately 446,682, of female students were either absent from school for the year (temporarily absent) or classified as permanently absent, while 11%, or 799,822, of male students were temporarily or permanently absent.<sup>15</sup>» Quelle: Oxfam, High Stakes: Girls' Education in Afghanistan, 24. Februar 2011, S. 4, 10: [www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/afghanistan-girls-education-022411.pdf](http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/afghanistan-girls-education-022411.pdf).*

Al Jazeera, 13. Juli 2012:

*«These students, proudly singing the Afghan national anthem, are among the 1'700 crammed into Pashtun Zargun Girls School. **The demand for women's education here is such that tents are used as overflow classrooms.** The building was only designed for 1,000 girls.*

*Mohammed Daoud, District Head of Education:*

*"It's a revolution. **There are families that say: If before you had forced us to send our daughters to school, we would have killed them. But now we're even willing to send our wives.**"*

*It's difficult to overstate the changes here. In 2009, twelve girls graduated from school. Previously only one woman, in the 1960s, completed her schooling in Pashtun Zargun. Even before the Taliban, women weren't educated.*

*Maryam Rafat, Headteacher, Pashtun Zargun Girls School: "We still have a cultural problem. It's a tribal problem. Some elders don't allow girls to come to school. Of course, people are working to change attitudes."*

*This year, 1,200 19-year-old women should graduate. But only 30 will manage it. **Most girls are pulled out of school by their parents when they reach puberty, around 14. Just a few manage to stay.***

*Azita Sahib Shahi, student:*

*"All my family, my mother and father, were illiterate. When they were supposed to be studying, there were no schools, nowhere to learn. So when we grew up, our parents thought about us. That's why they send us to school."*

*Ancient cultural attitudes will take more than a decade to change. But improved security has at least allowed a framework to be put in place.» Quelle: Al Jazeera, Afghan women overflow Herat's schools, 13. Juli 2012 (inoffizielle Transkription): [www.youtube.com/watch?v=zKGmKeB\\_XMs](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zKGmKeB_XMs) .*

*Reliefweb, 6. Juli 2015:*

*«Freedom of education for girls is still a far-fetched dream in Afghanistan. In a new incident, **three girls in the Herat province were attacked with acid by two men on a motorbike for going to school.** The three girls, aged between 16 to 18 years, study in Mehri in one of the biggest girls' schools in Herat. The head of the education department for the province confirmed the attack, adding that **school authorities are concerned over the number of threats against girls going to school.**» Quelle: Reliefweb, Girls attacked for attending school, 6. Juli 2015: <http://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/girls-attacked-attending-school>.*

#### 4 Wahlbeteiligung

**Wahlbeteiligung hängt nicht von religiöser Einstellung ab.** Die untenstehenden Quellen zeigen auf, dass Wahlbeteiligung und politische Partizipation in Afghanistan nicht von der religiösen Einstellung bestimmt wird, sondern viel eher von der Sicherheitslage und generell verbreitetem Misstrauen gegenüber politischen Parteien.

*USDOS, 25. Juni 2015:*

*«Political Parties and Political Participation: **Negative past associations with violent militia groups and the former communist regime, as well as allegations of persistent corruption and inefficiency, led many citizens to view political parties with suspicion.** The 2009 Party Law granted parties the right to exist as formal institutions for the first time in the country's history. The law requires parties to have at*

least 10,000 members from a minimum of 22 of the country's 34 provinces. **Political parties were not always able to conduct activities throughout the country, particularly in regions where antigovernment violence affected overall security. Violence against participants in the political party system was common, even during nonelection periods.** (...) Political parties played a greater role in the 2014 presidential elections than in previous elections, and their organization, networks, and manpower contributed to the success of presidential candidates Abdullah and Ghani. Close to a dozen major political parties and coalitions from across the ethnic and political spectrum campaigned on behalf of the presidential candidates, and the parties' leadership played key roles in the campaigns.» Quelle: US Department of State (USDOS): Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2014 - Afghanistan, 25. Juni 2015: [http://www.ecoi.net/local\\_link/306241/443515\\_de.html](http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/306241/443515_de.html).

ACCORD, 4. Mai 2015:

«Die Nachrichtenagentur Inter Press Service (IPS) erwähnt in einem Artikel über die Präsidentschaftswahlen vom 5. April 2014, dass die Taliban angegeben haben, landesweit fast 1.088 Angriffe auf Wahllokale und Fahrzeuge, die Stimmzettel, Wahlmaterialien und Wahlurnen transportierten, verübt zu haben. **Das afghanische Innenministerium hat nach eigenen Angaben nur 690 sicherheitsrelevante Vorfälle registriert. Wie der Artikel anführt, haben die Wahlen, anders als in den unsicheren ländlichen Gebieten des Landes, in Städten in relativer Sicherheit stattgefunden und die Wahlbeteiligung war dort höher.**» Quelle: ACCORD – Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation: ecoi.net-Themendossier zu Afghanistan: Allgemeine Sicherheitslage in Afghanistan & Chronologie für Kabul, 4. Mai 2015: [www.ecoi.net/local\\_link/304849/442013\\_de.html](http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/304849/442013_de.html).

NZZ, 21. August 2009:

«Die Wahlbeteiligung lag nach Angaben der Wahlkommission (IEC) bei etwa 60 Prozent. Mehr als sieben Millionen der rund zwölf Millionen Wahlberechtigten hätten am Samstag ihre Stimme abgegeben, sagte der IEC-Chef Jusuf Nuristani.

Nach der ersten Wahlrunde am 5. April hatte die IEC ebenfalls rund sieben Millionen Stimmen registriert. Nach Betrugsvorwürfen waren 6,6 Millionen als gültig gezählt worden, was einer **Beteiligung von etwa 55 Prozent entspricht**. Befürchtet worden war eine geringere Beteiligung an der Stichwahl. (...)

Aus einigen ländlichen Gegenden berichteten Augenzeugen allerdings, dass **Drohungen der Taliban Wähler von der Stimmabgabe abschreckten**. In mehr als 330 Wahllokalen im Land gingen die Wahlzettel aus, die Wahlkommission musste Nachschub liefern. In der ersten Wahlrunde am 5. April hatte die Wahlbeteiligung bei 55 Prozent gelegen.» Quelle: NZZ, Afghanistan hat gewählt, 14. Juni 2014: [www.nzz.ch/international/asien-und-pazifik/afghanistan-hat-gewaehlt-1.18322260](http://www.nzz.ch/international/asien-und-pazifik/afghanistan-hat-gewaehlt-1.18322260).

«Im Süden und Osten war die Beteiligung katastrophal», sagte ein internationaler Wahlbeobachter, der ungenannt bleiben wollte, am Freitag der Deutschen Presse-Agentur in Kabul. **In den Unruhegebieten, in denen die Taliban stark sind, hätten nur zwischen fünf und 15 Prozent der Wähler ihre Stimme abgegeben. Im Norden**

*seien es bis zu 60 Prozent, im Westen maximal 50 Prozent gewesen. Die Taliban hatten Wähler bedroht.*

*Insgesamt haben bei der Präsidentschaftswahl in Afghanistan nach Einschätzung internationaler Beobachter weniger als die Hälfte der nach offiziellen Angaben 17 Millionen registrierten Wähler ihre Stimme abgegeben. **Die Beteiligung lag damit drastisch unter jener bei der Präsidentschaftswahl 2004. Damals hatten nach offiziellen Angaben gegen 80 Prozent der registrierten Wähler ihre Stimme abgegeben. Der Beobachter warnte, während des Auszählungsprozesses könne es zum Wahlbetrug kommen.***» Quelle: NZZ, «Katastrophale» Wahlbeteiligung in Südafghanistan, 21. August 2009: [www.nzz.ch/afghanistan-wahl-beteiligung-1.3387579](http://www.nzz.ch/afghanistan-wahl-beteiligung-1.3387579).

Pandya und Laipson (Ed.), 2009:

*«Interviews with locals in six different provinces including Kabul, indicate a growing frustration with the government's lack of effort in integrating religious leaders into the political process. (...)*

***Historically, the central governments in Kabul have kept both the tribal leaders and the religious figures at arm's length and tried to limit or undermine their influence.** The role of religious scholars and their influence, however, increased exponentially with the jihad against the Soviets and the subsequent civil war among the mujahideen factions and the Taliban regime. During each of these phases, religious preachers provided legitimacy to actions that often sanctioned violence in the name of Islam. **During the last six years, however, because of the dependence of the government on the support from the international community, and Western nations in particular, the role of religious figures has declined. The current administration has done little, if anything, to seriously integrate the religious leaders into the political process.** This is largely because of the Western world's apprehension of the link—both perceived and demonstrated—between religious education and violent extremism. (...)*

*The marginalization of the religious leaders, along with the government's inability to offer them protection, contributes to the **widening gulf between religious actors and the government.** In addition, **conservative religious leaders believe the clergy should be independent of the government,** and view any government support of the clergy as a strategy of co-optation to gain legitimacy. (...)*

*Although religious leaders have played a crucial role in the fortunes of Afghanistan during the last three decades of the 20th century, over the past few years they have been largely sidelined from mainstream politics. **Their loss of position since the fall of the Taliban has been the result of changes in Afghan society wrought by refugees outside their influence returning from Pakistan and Iran, Western influences on the government, cultural influences resulting from foreign aid and from the presence of non-Afghans and returning Afghan expatriates, and the continuation of violent conflicts and the political instability and insecurity that accompany these.***» Quelle: Prakhar Sharma, Role of Religion in Afghan Politics: Evolution and Key Trends; in: Amit, Pandya; Ellen, Laipson (Ed.), Islam and Politics: Renewal and Resistance in the Muslim World, 2009: S. 33-37.

## 5 Sicherheitslage in der Stadt Herat

**Die Sicherheitslage in der Stadt Herat hat sich in den letzten Jahren verschlechtert.** Gemäss dem EASO-Bericht vom Januar 2015, der einen Bericht des niederländischen Aussenministeriums vom September 2014 zitiert, hat sich die Situation im Westen Afghanistans einschliesslich der Provinz Herat verschlechtert. Bewaffnete Oppositionsgruppen übten Anschläge in der Provinzhauptstadt aus, was in früheren Jahren nicht der Fall war. So griffen Rebellen laut *BBC* (23. Mai 2014) im Mai 2014 das indische Konsulat in der Stadt Herat an. Für einen Angriff auf das US-amerikanische Konsulat in der Stadt Herat im September 2013 übernahmen laut *Reuters* (13. September 2013) die Taliban die Verantwortung. Im November 2011 attackierten Rebellen laut *BBC* (3. November 2011) ein Privatunternehmen in der Stadt Herat. Im Juli desselben Jahres hatten NATO-Truppen die Sicherheitsverantwortung für die Stadt an die afghanischen Streitkräfte übergeben.

EASO, Januar 2015:

*«The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated in September 2014 that the level of violence in the north of Afghanistan was relatively low compared to the South and East which were the most volatile regions. According to the Ministry, Faryab was the most unstable province in the north. **The situation in the west was marked by a significant change in the attitude of insurgents in the province of Herat. They conducted attacks on the capital of Herat, which was not seen recently.** In the centre, there was an increase in incidents, even in provinces that were more stable before. Daykundi, Pansjir and Bamyán were said to be the quietest provinces, although not without incident.»* Quelle: EASO, Afghanistan: Security situation, Januar 2015, S. 34: <https://easo.europa.eu/wp-content/uploads/Afghanistan-security-situation-EN.pdf>.

*BBC*, 23. Mai 2014:

*«**Heavily-armed gunmen launched a pre-dawn attack on the Indian consulate in the Afghan city of Herat.** At least three attackers stormed nearby houses to fire on the compound with machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, police said. The gunmen were killed in a firefight with security forces that lasted several hours, officials added. **Afghanistan has seen a surge in attacks in recent weeks as foreign troops begin to withdraw from the country. Questions will now be asked as to how insurgents were able to get into one of the most secure parts of Herat,** the *BBC's* Bilal Sarwary reports from Kabul. (...)*

*It is not clear who carried out this attack, but previous incidents have been blamed on militants from the Haqqani network, an al Qaeda-linked group suspected of having ties to Pakistani military intelligence.»* Quelle: *BBC*, Indian consulate in Herat, Afghanistan attacked, 23. Mai 2014: [www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-27533268](http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-27533268).

*Reuters*, 13. September 2013:

*«**At least three people were killed when insurgents attacked the U.S. consulate in western Afghanistan's main city on Friday, detonating a powerful truck bomb***



*outside the front gates and launching a gun battle with security forces, officials said. The bold attack in Herat, claimed by the Taliban, once again underscored a worrying security picture as Afghanistan prepares to take over from foreign combat troops after 12 years of war and stage crucial presidential elections next year.»* Quelle: Reuters, At least three killed as insurgents attack U.S. consulate in Afghan west, 13. September 2013:

[www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/13/us-afghanistan-attack-consulate-idUSBRE98C02Q20130913#IRRIFX5Reht45FqM.97](http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/13/us-afghanistan-attack-consulate-idUSBRE98C02Q20130913#IRRIFX5Reht45FqM.97).

BBC, 3. November 2011:

*«**Militants have carried out a suicide gun and bomb attack on a private construction company in the western Afghan city of Herat, officials say. Two guards were killed and four other people wounded, the officials say, with the fighting now said to be over. The attack began with a blast at the company's compound in a district close to the city's airport. Nato handed security control of Herat city to Afghan forces in July, ahead of a full combat troop pullout in 2014.** (...)*

'Terror groups'

*"Our initial information shows one suicide attacker detonated his explosive vest outside a private security firm in the industrial area," Herat provincial spokesman Mohayddin Noori told the BBC's Bilal Sarwary. **At least two gunmen then entered the offices of the firm, which reportedly works with foreign forces on logistics, officials said.**»* Quelle: BBC, Afghanistan 'suicide attack' hits city of Herat, 3. November 2011:

[www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-15568990](http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-15568990).

## 6 Psychische Krankheiten

**Posttraumatische Belastungsstörung und andere psychische Krankheiten als Folge von Krieg und Gewalt, Stigmatisierung von psychischen Krankheiten.** Laut *Guardian* (2. September 2015), WHO (ohne Datum) und *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty* (RFE/RL) (3. Mai 2012) stellen psychische Krankheiten wie posttraumatische Belastungsstörung, Depression und Angstzustände, die durch den Krieg hervorgerufen wurden, eine verborgene Epidemie in Afghanistan dar. Bereits 2005 litten gemäss *Guardian* (2. September 2015) 16,5 Prozent der Afghanen an psychischen Krankheiten, und das Problem dürfte sich seitdem höchstwahrscheinlich noch vergrößert haben. Während alle Provinzspitäler inzwischen psychische Beratung anbieten, kämpfen die Berater selbst in der Hauptstadt Kabul gegen lange Traditionen und eine Kultur der Stigmatisierung von psychisch Kranken an. Viele Afghanen greifen laut *Guardian* (2. September 2015) und RFE/RL (3. Mai 2012) bei psychischen Krankheiten aus Tradition oder Kostengründen auf Drogen oder abergläubische Praktiken an Schreinen («*ziyarats*») zurück, die oft mehr schaden als nutzen. Beispielsweise ist eine «Behandlung» am Schrein Mia Ali Baba mit umgerechnet 20 Dollar billiger als Arzneimittel oder der Transport zum nächsten Spital. Die lange Dauer einer psychischen Behand-

lung in Spital schreckt laut RFE/RL (3. Mai 2012) besonders Patientinnen und Patienten aus entlegenen ländlichen Gebieten wegen der hohen Kosten ab. Psychische Beratung wird ausserdem mit Skepsis betrachtet, da das Mitteilen von persönlichen Themen und Familiengeheimnissen als kulturell nicht angemessen gilt.

Guardian, 2. September 2015:

**«Fourteen years of violence have created a hidden epidemic in Afghanistan of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and other war-induced illnesses. It is one of the most enduring damages wrought by the war – one few people understand, and fewer can treat. But a small army of therapists now seeks to change that. And they are led by a woman. “We are in a vicious cycle of violence and trauma,” said Dr Fareshta Quedeas, project manager at the International Psychosocial Organisation (Ipsa) in Kabul and the driving force behind training 280 psychosocial counsellors who work across the country. (...)**

**A UN-sponsored survey found that in 2005, 16.5% of Afghans suffered from mental disorders. The problem is likely to have grown since then. The Afghan government has made tackling mental illness a priority and developed a national mental health strategy. All provincial hospitals now offer counselling. Counselling is free, and even available online. (...)**

**But Quedeas’s counsellors are working against long-held traditions and a culture of stigmatisation of the mentally ill. Faced with mental disorder, many resort to drugs or superstitious practices that often cause more harm than good. Critics claim the treatment at shrines like Mia Ali Baba is a hoax, which sedates patients suffering from hunger and maltreatment rather than curing them. Still, locals maintain a strong belief in their healing powers. One of them, Nasibullah Subara, said the treatment had helped his nephew. “Before, he didn’t sleep. He had a short temper and bothered his family. But now he doesn’t have those problems,” Subara said. The \$20 cost of the treatment at the shrine is cheaper than medicine or a trip to the nearest hospital. As a result, the shrine’s 16 cells are often full. (...)** Modern therapy is also at odds with the sense of privacy so paramount in Afghan culture. **“Many people don’t like the concept of counselling. It is not appropriate in our culture to share intimate matters and family secrets,”** said Fatma Dauladzai, a counsellor from Paktia province. **But while the idea of counselling has yet to take firm root, women, especially, are growing more receptive.»** Quelle: The Guardian, Afghanistan tackles hidden mental health epidemic, 2. September 2015: [www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/sep/02/afghanistan-tackles-hidden-mental-health-epidemic-therapists](http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/sep/02/afghanistan-tackles-hidden-mental-health-epidemic-therapists).

WHO, Zugriff am 18. November 2015:

**«The Afghanistan National Survey on Mental Health 2003–2005 showed that 16.5% of the adult population in the country was suffering from mental health disorders. In Afghanistan, health care facilities specific to mental health care services are few and far between. The Ministry of Public Health has upgraded mental health from second tier to first tier, thereby making mental health among the top five priori-**

*ties of the Ministry. Mental health is one of the components of the existing framework of the basic package of health services. (...) However, it has not been fully integrated at the delivery level because of financial and human resource constraints. (...) The stigmatization associated socially with mental health disorders is the greatest barrier for addressing this important global health issue. The stigma and violations of human rights is not only directed towards people with mental, neurological and substance use disorders, but by extension it affects the mental health care providers in the formal and informal sectors further compounding the problem.»*  
Quelle: World Health Organization (WHO), Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean, Afghanistan Mental Health, ohne Datum (Zugriff am 18. November 2015): [www.emro.who.int/afg/programmes/mental-health.html](http://www.emro.who.int/afg/programmes/mental-health.html).

RFE/RL, 3. Mai 2012:

*«Among the mental illnesses affecting Afghans most are depression, anxiety, and posttraumatic stress disorder, but precise statistics are difficult to pin down. (...) With some 30 million inhabitants, Afghanistan has only a handful of mental-health treatment facilities nationwide. In Kabul, the state's main facility has a capacity to treat just 60 patients at a time. There are specialized hospital wards in Jalalabad, in eastern Afghanistan, and Herat, in the west. In the northern city of Mazar-i Sharif a gleaming, private hospital helps fill the void. Other than that there are no other medical facilities to treat mental patients throughout Afghanistan's 34 provinces. Azizuddin Hemat, head of the government-run Society of Mental Health Specialists, says the situation is dire, especially in the country's regions, but that there are positive developments. He singles out the private Alemi Neuro Psychiatric Hospital in Mazar-i Sharif – the administrative center of Balkh Province – as a particular source of pride when it comes to treating patients with mental health-problems. (...) Public awareness of the problem is seen as key to treating it in a country where mental illnesses are seldom recognized as a medical issue, and are often covered up by family members out of shame. (...) Sufferers often turn to holy shrines known as 'ziyarats' for treatment. Prominent 'ziyarats' such as Niali Saheb in Nangarhar, Shams Saheb in Ghazni province, and Shpole Baba in the eastern Mahipar town have become a popular destination for tens of thousands of people suffering from depression. (...) Time and money are a hindrance, according to Alemi [Dr. Nader Alemi, owner of the Alemi Neuro Psychiatric Hospital in Mazar-i-Sharif]. While treatment for depression, for example, usually takes many months, the majority of his patients come from remote rural areas and cannot afford extended hospital stays.»*  
Quelle: RFE/RL – Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Little Succor For Afghanistan's Mentally Ill, 3. Mai 2012: [www.ecoi.net/local\\_link/215746/336402\\_de.html](http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/215746/336402_de.html).