

## **Schnellrecherche der SFH-Länderanalyse vom 23. August 2017 zu Afghanistan: Rekrutierung und Reflexverfolgung im Distrikt Khanabad, Provinz Kunduz**

Fragen an die SFH-Länderanalyse:

- Inwiefern laufen junge Männer in Khanabad/Kunduz Gefahr, durch die Taliban, IS/Daesh oder andere Gruppen rekrutiert zu werden?
- Welche Informationen gibt es über die Verfolgung von Familienangehörigen von Polizisten durch die Taliban, IS/Daesh oder andere Gruppen in Khanabad/Kunduz?

Die Informationen beruhen auf einer zeitlich begrenzten Recherche (Schnellrecherche) in öffentlich zugänglichen Dokumenten, die uns derzeit zur Verfügung stehen, sowie auf den Informationen von sachkundigen Kontaktpersonen.

### **1 Aktuelle Präsenz der Taliban in Kunduz einschliesslich Khanabad**

**Taliban sollen aktuell grosse Teile des Distrikts Khanabad sowie anderer Distrikte in der Provinz Kunduz kontrollieren, weitere Teile sind umkämpft.** Laut einem Artikel des *Long War Journal* (LWJ) vom 9. Mai 2017 standen die Taliban zu diesem Zeitpunkt kurz davor, die Kontrolle über den Distrikt Khanabad wieder zu erlangen. Nach eigenen Angaben kontrollierten sie 80 Prozent von Khanabad einschliesslich des Distriktzentrums sowie grosse Teile von weiteren Distrikten in der Provinz Kunduz. Zwar seien die Angaben der Taliban bezüglich Gebietskontrolle schwierig zu bewerten. LWJ hält sie allerdings für glaubhaft. Darüber hinaus unterschieden sie sich nicht grundlegend von einer entsprechenden Einschätzung des US-amerikanischen *Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction* (SIGAR).

Zuvor hatten die Taliban laut *Reuters* (20. August 2016) die Kontrolle über den Distrikt Khanabad im August 2016 erlangt. Im Oktober 2016 eroberten sie laut NYT (3. Oktober 2016) mehrere Quartiere im Zentrum der Provinzhauptstadt Kunduz. Bereits im Oktober 2015 gehörte Khanabad gemäss LWJ (13. Oktober 2015) zu den Distrikten in der Provinz Kunduz, von denen die Taliban laut eigenen Angaben grosse Teile kontrollierten. Die Kontrolle von Khanabad und von anderen Distrikten habe es ihnen ermöglicht, die Provinzhauptstadt Kunduz im Oktober 2015 rasch einzunehmen. Auch AAN (16. Oktober 2015) erklärt die schnelle Einnahme der Provinzhauptstadt Kunduz im Oktober 2015 durch die Taliban mit den Entwicklungen in den umliegenden Distrikten einschliesslich Khanabad, wo die Taliban in den sechs Monaten zuvor oder bereits seit längerem Fuss fassen konnten.

AAN, 16. Oktober 2015:



**«It took 15 days of fierce fighting for Afghan government forces and their US allies to push the Taleban back out of Kunduz city. Clashes continue in the surrounding districts. The Taleban onslaught on 28 September should not have**

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*come as a surprise, given how much territory in the province the group was already controlling. (...)*

*To understand the rapid fall of Kunduz city, one needs to look at what was happening in the surrounding districts over the previous six months, if not longer, and how that allowed the Taliban to gain a foothold and to exploit the weaknesses on the government side.»* Quelle: AAN, The 2015 Insurgency in the North (3): The fall and recapture of Kunduz, 16. Oktober 2015:  
[www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-2015-insurgency-in-the-north-3-the-fall-and-recapture-of-kunduz/](http://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-2015-insurgency-in-the-north-3-the-fall-and-recapture-of-kunduz/).

LWJ, 9. Mai 2017:

*«In addition to the fighting in Qala-i-Zal, the Taliban is threatening to retake Khanabad district, and has blocked the highway between the district and Kunduz City. The Taliban claimed it has killed 25 Afghan security personnel and destroyed 11 “tanks,” which are most likely armored vehicles. The Taliban claims cannot be independently confirmed.*

*Prior to the renewed push to take Kunduz, the Taliban, in a statement released on March 26, claimed it controls 60 percent or more of six of Kunduz’s seven districts (the Taliban did not provide an assessment of Kunduz district). According to the Taliban, 95 percent of Dasht-i-Archi and Char Dara – except for the district centers – are Taliban controlled, plus 80 percent of Khanabad – including the district center – is in the Taliban’s hands, while 70 percent of Qala-i-Zal and Imam Sahib, and 60 percent of Aliabad is run by the Taliban.*

*While the Taliban’s claims of control are difficult to assess, FDD’s Long War Journal has determined them to be credible. Additionally, the Taliban’s claims are not that different from an assessment from the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.»* Quelle: Long War Journal, Taliban back on the offensive in Kunduz, 9. Mai 2017:  
[www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/05/taliban-back-on-the-offensive-in-kunduz.php](http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/05/taliban-back-on-the-offensive-in-kunduz.php).

LWJ, 13. Oktober 2015:

*«Despite its withdrawal, however, the Taliban still controls all of the districts surrounding Kunduz city. Indeed, the jihadists were able to make swift advances in the city itself in part because they are already firmly entrenched in the outlying areas. (...)*

*The Taliban also lists all of the areas where its forces have purportedly made gains during its northern offensive:*

*Kunduz which is considered militarily strategic and a command center for the entire north east provinces of Afghanistan was attacked and taken over by Mujahideen, causing a wave of panic in the enemy ranks as a result of which large areas were completely cleared by Mujahideen with negligible casualties and small scale operations in Kunduz, Baghlan, Takhar, Badakhshan and other provinces of the*

north. Amidst this advance, Baghlan's Talaw Barfak district, tens of villages and military bases in Markazi Baghlan and Pul-e-Kumri districts; Takhar's Eshkamesh, Yangi Qala and Khwaja Ghar districts; Badakhshan Warduj and Baharak districts; Faryab's Khwaja NaMusa and Garzewan districts; Saripul's Kohistanat district; Jawzjan's Kham Aab district; entire districts of Imam Sahib, Qala Zaal and Chahr Dara **and large parts of Khanabad and Aliabad districts all fell to the Mujahideen in a few short days** while tens of vehicles, hundreds of heavy and light arms and large amounts of other equipment were also seized by the Mujahideen and subsequently transferred to secure locations. Such consecutive conquests had not been witnessed in the recent past.

Given that the Taliban has made a major push throughout all of Kunduz province, as well as throughout northern Afghanistan, the city of Kunduz will likely be threatened once again in the future.» Quelle: Long War Journal, Taliban announces withdrawal from center of Kunduz city, 13. Oktober 2015:  
[www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/10/taliban-announces-withdrawal-from-center-of-kunduz-city.php](http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/10/taliban-announces-withdrawal-from-center-of-kunduz-city.php).

NYT, 3. Oktober 2016:

«**The Taliban overran central neighborhoods in the critical Afghan provincial capital of Kunduz on Monday, planting their flag in the city's main roundabout and shaking the Afghan government in a repeat of the insurgents' assault on the city a year ago.**» Quelle: NYT, Emboldened Taliban Overrun Parts of Kunduz and Taunt Afghan Forces, 3. Oktober 2016:  
[www.nytimes.com/2016/10/04/world/asia/afghanistan-kunduz-taliban.html?mcubz=0&\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/04/world/asia/afghanistan-kunduz-taliban.html?mcubz=0&_r=0).

Reuters, 20. August 2016:

«**The Afghan Taliban captured a strategic district in the northern province of Kunduz on Saturday, forcing troops to retreat to the provincial capital which fell briefly to the insurgents last year, officials said.**

*Fighting has sharply escalated in Afghanistan since the insurgency started spreading from its traditional strongholds in the south and east of the country to the once peaceful north.*

**The militants seized the district of Khanabad, which connects Kunduz to Takhar and other northern provinces, in the early morning, with heavy fighting ongoing in several other districts, the officials said. "The Taliban attacked the district from different positions and we resisted for hours but we received no support. The district fell to the Taliban," said Hayatullah Amiri, the Khanabad chief.**

Quelle: Reuters, Taliban make further gains in Afghan north, 20. August 2016:  
[www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-district-idUSKCN10V07C?il=0](http://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-district-idUSKCN10V07C?il=0).

## 2 Hintergrund: Milizen im Distrikt Khanabad

**Prekäre Sicherheitslage in Khanabad, Kontrolle durch Milizen.** Gemäss einem Artikel des *Afghanistan Analysts Network* (AAN) vom 28. Oktober 2014 gehörte der Distrikt Khanabad in der Provinz Kunduz bereits im Frühjahr 2014 zu den Gebieten im Norden Afghanistans, in denen die Sicherheitslage am prekärsten war. Die Sicherheitslage im Distrikt Khanabad sei laut einem von AAN (28. Oktober 2014) zitierten *lokalen Journalisten* bereits 2012 sehr schlecht gewesen.

Viele Bewohner des Distrikts sahen die Hauptbedrohung nicht bei den Taliban, sondern bei den vielen bewaffneten Milizen (auch bekannt als «*arbakis*», illegal bewaffnete Gruppen) einschliesslich prominenter ehemaliger Mujahedin-Kommandeure, die den Distrikt kontrollierten. Der Distrikt war laut AAN (28. Oktober 2014) in Machtbereiche verschiedener Milizkommandeure und Unterkommandeure aufgeteilt, von denen viele Verbindungen zu hochrangigen Regierungsvertretern im Distrikt Khanabad und in der Provinz Kunduz hatten. Wegen der Schwäche der staatlichen Sicherheitskräfte gab es gemäss dem von AAN (28. Oktober 2014) zitierten *lokalen Journalisten* im Distrikt Khanabad fast in jedem Haus eine Schusswaffe.

Einige der Milizen waren laut dem von AAN (28. Oktober 2014) zitierten Distriktgouverneur von Khanabad, *Hayatullah Amiri*, bereits 2008 gegründet worden, um die Taliban zurückzuschlagen. Ihre Anzahl sei seither stark angestiegen. Im Oktober 2014 standen 1500 «illegal bewaffneten Männern» nur 170 Polizisten gegenüber, von denen 20 als Wachmänner für lokale Regierungsvertreter und Mitglieder des Provinzrats eingesetzt waren. Die übrigen 150 Polizisten waren für die Sicherheit auf zwei wichtigen Strassen verantwortlich (Khanabad-Aliabad und Kunduz-Takhar), auf denen es 28 Kontrollpunkte gab. Mehrere Versuche, die Milizen zu entwaffnen, schlugen laut *Amiri* fehl. Ihre Entwaffnung sei schlicht unmöglich. Ausserdem seien die staatlichen Sicherheitskräfte ohne Unterstützung durch Milizen nicht in der Lage, sich den Taliban zu widersetzen. Gemäss einem Artikel von IRIN vom 7. September 2015, der ebenfalls *Amiri* zitiert, stieg die Zahl der Milizkämpfer im Distrikt Khanabad allein im Jahr 2015 um 1000 auf 3000 an.

**Ruinöse «Besteuerung» der Zivilbevölkerung durch Milizen, da sie vom Staat keinen Sold erhielten.** Laut AAN (28. Oktober 2014) und AAN (16. Oktober 2015) erpressten *arbakis* Geld von Zivilpersonen, stahlen die Ernte und belegten Geschäftsleute, Ladeninhaber und Bauern mit ruinösen «Steuern». So wurden lokale Geschäftsleute gemäss einem von AAN (16. Oktober 2015) zitierten Ältesten aus dem Distrikt Khanabad von den Milizen gezwungen, viermal im Jahr an vier verschiedene Milizkommandeure «Steuern» zu zahlen. Laut einem von IRIN (7. September 2015) zitierten Dorfbewohner informierte beispielsweise ein berüchtigter Kommandeur namens *Qadeerak* die Bewohner des Dorfes Char Tut im Distrikt Khanabad, dass sie seiner Miliz monatlich von nun an 3000 Afghanis (50 US-Dollar) statt wie bisher 500 Afghanis (8 US-Dollar) zahlen müssten. Wer nicht zahle, müsse das Dorf verlassen. Gemäss dem von IRIN (7. September 2015) zitierten stellvertretenden Gouverneur der Provinz Kunduz, *Hamdullah Danishi*, ist der Grund für die ruinöse «Besteuerung» durch Milizen die Tatsache, dass die Regierung diese zwar mit Munition und Nahrung versorge, während sie kämpfen, ihnen aber keinen Sold zahle. Laut AAN (16. Oktober 2015) diskreditierten sich die Milizen dadurch bei wei-

ten Teilen der Bevölkerung selbst und indirekt auch den afghanischen Staat, der sie nicht kontrollieren konnte.

**Gezielte Tötungen durch Milizen.** Zusätzlich zur «Besteuerung» der lokalen Bevölkerung waren die Milizen im Distrikt Khanabad gemäss AAN (28. Oktober 2014) für eine hohe Zahl von Ermordungen, Rachemorden und gezielten Tötungen verantwortlich, die täglich verübt worden seien.

**Milizen kämpften gegen staatliche Sicherheitskräfte und gegeneinander.** Laut AAN (28. Oktober 2014) kämpften die Milizen auch gegen staatliche Sicherheitskräfte einschliesslich der *Afghan National Police*, obwohl sie regelmässig von staatlichen Sicherheitskräften um Unterstützung gegen die Taliban gebeten wurden. Gemäss AAN (16. Oktober 2015) kooperierten die Milizkommandeure während der Angriffe durch die Taliban nicht miteinander, sondern wandten sich gegeneinander, um sich gegenseitig auszuschalten. Laut AAN (28. Oktober 2014) setzten sie dazu unkonventionelle Sprengkörper ein, lockten sich gegenseitig in Hinterhalte und nahmen gezielte Tötungen vor.

**2014 und 2015 konnten die Taliban ihre Präsenz in Khanabad ausbauen.** In mehreren Distrikten der Provinz Kunduz einschliesslich Khanabad scheinen Vertreter der Lokalregierung gemäss AAN (16. Oktober 2015) wegen ihrer Verbindungen zu Milizkommandeuren absichtlich nicht eingegriffen und nicht versucht zu haben, rechtsstaatliche Prinzipien in den Machtbereichen der Milizen durchzusetzen. In einigen Dörfern boten Bewohner den Taliban Schutz in der Hoffnung, die Milizen dadurch loszuwerden. Die Taliban konnten so in Khanabad und anderen Distrikten der Provinz Fuss fassen. Gemäss einem von AAN (16. Oktober 2015) zitierten Ältesten aus dem Distrikt Khanabad zogen die Taliban anders als die Milizen nur einmal im Jahr und nur durch einen einzigen Kommandeur «Steuern» ein.

Bereits 2014 konnten die Taliban laut AAN (28. Oktober 2014) dank der sich verschlechternden Sicherheitslage ihre Präsenz im Distrikt Khanabad ausbauen und schwächere Milizgruppen vertreiben. Sie kontrollierten mehrere Dörfer in den paschtunischen und paschtunisch dominierten Gebieten des Distrikts und bauten dort eine Verwaltung und Gerichte auf.

AAN, 28. Oktober 2014:

*«By spring of this year [2014] it was clear that **Khanabad district in Kunduz province was, in terms of security, one of the most vulnerable areas in the north.** The worsening security is complicated by the divided nature of political and military power in Khanabad. (...)*

***Many people in Khanabad district do not consider the Taleban to be the main threat to their security and livelihoods. They complain about the many “irresponsible armed groups” – a synonym widely used locally for ‘free-lance’ armed groups that are not formally under government control but loyal to local ‘strongmen’, including prominent former mujahedin commanders. These armed groups extort money from farmers and shopkeepers while threatening kidnap or death. Hayatullah Amiri, the district governor of Khanabad, claims that some of these groups, despite the abuses they commit, are helpful to the Afghan government.***

Nevertheless, on 19 August he appealed to President Ashraf Ghani to assist him in preventing these groups from harassing and looting the people of Khanabad.

**Speaking to AAN, district governor Ameri** outlined the various illegal armed groups in Khanabad district that he named as major concerns for the Afghan government. Ameri divides these groups into three categories, without noting the obvious overlaps they may have: 1) groups led by former jihadi commanders, 2) armed militias that are currently fighting against the Taleban, and 3) criminal groups. **He stated that some of these groups were established six years ago to push back against the Taleban. But with no plan to disarm or control these groups, their numbers increased rapidly. Currently there are more than 1500 'illegal armed men' in the district. Most of them are rivals and are engaged in various disputes with each other. The district only has 170 police service members, with 20 of them serving as security guards for some local government officials and provincial council members. The rest, 150 policemen, are tasked with ensuring security for two major roads, Khanabad-Aliabad and Kunduz-Takhar, where they have 28 check posts.**

**Recently, the provincial authority received an official letter from the Interior Ministry to disarm the 'irresponsible groups' within ten days (not the first attempt to do so, see here), which Ameri said is impossible. He further noted the government's dilemma: because some of these armed groups are protecting their areas from Taleban expansion, if the government is to disarm them, the government security forces would not be able to resist the Taleban.**

*Current situation in Khanabad*

**A local journalist in Kunduz province told AAN that the security situation in Khanabad has become quite "frightening" with no public protection at all. However, this is not a new phenomenon, with the security situation in this area being dire for the last two years. The high presence of illegal armed groups and armed anti-government elements has created a chaotic environment in the district. As a result of this dire security situation, there is almost no house without a weapon in Khanabad district. In fact, the journalist noted, it is hard to survive without a gun, since the security forces (ie, the ANP) are too limited in numbers and weak in capacity to take strong security measures. Criminal groups in Khanabad benefit from this permissive atmosphere and continue to harass local residents. Every small area in Khanabad is ruled or affected by criminal groups, usually consisting of five to twenty armed men. These groups are often involved in robbery, extorting money from locals and taking illegal taxes from markets and businessmen.**

**A recent visitor to Khanabad who travelled for business spoke with AAN and noted the heavy presence of arbakis, a term locally used for these 'illegal armed groups.' The arbakis have thousands of armed fighters, and in every village the sight of young men with guns ruling the area is common. Aside from extorting money from civilians and stealing the harvests, these various armed groups are busy fighting each other. It has become hard to keep track of the high number of assassinations, revenges murders and targeted killings, which happen every single day.**

*A local mullah told the AAN source that he alone has performed funeral prayers for 173 men in just the past three months.*

*Infighting between commanders most often breaks out over collection of taxes and control of resources (mainly water). **Rival commanders from opposing factions, or within the same faction, resort to IEDs, ambushes and targeted killing to eliminate each other. (...)***

***Illegal armed groups not only fight each other, but also enter into confrontation with the ANSF.** During Eid last year, a clash that arose between ANP and some illegally armed groups in Kanam Kalan resulting in the killing of six, including civilians. Explaining the scene, a resident of the area reported: The incident arose when commander Qadir asked the people of Kanam Kalan to pay him ushr. When people reacted and asked the police to take Qadirak out of their village along with his militias, the fight began. As a result of a bloody clash among the police and Qadirak's gunmen six people were killed.*

*A local police officer talked about a recent attack on Abdul Manan: Commander Mir Alam's militias recently launched an attack on the Bandar-e Shorab checkpoint, aiming to enter into the district center. They wanted to create chaos among the people and discredit Abdul Manan (former chief of police) to replace him with someone from their own group. This happened even though the ANSF regularly seeks support from the commanders when launching clearing operations against insurgents.» Quelle: AAN, Security in Kunduz Worsening Further: The case of Khanabad, 28. Oktober 2014:*

*[www.afghanistan-analysts.org/security-in-kunduz-worsening-further-the-case-of-khanabad/](http://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/security-in-kunduz-worsening-further-the-case-of-khanabad/).*

AAN, 16. Oktober 2015:

*«**The one remaining district in the province which the Taleban did not control or have significant influence in – Khanabad to the east of Kunduz city – had in the meantime also started to attract the insurgents' attention. The local pro-government militias' in-fighting and aggressive behaviour had already shown up the government's inability to protect its people, while the rivalry and revenge-taking among different groups of militias in Khanabad was creating an environment of chaos in the district.***

***Particularly this year, the militias had been targeting businessmen, shopkeepers and farmers for predatory taxation. This widely discredited them and, indirectly, the state which failed to control them.***

***In many cases, the situation was bad enough to actually provoke some locals to support the insurgents. In Khanabad district, for instance, villages were divided between militias 'as individuals' territories' where they milked the locals for resources to ensure their financial survival. Many villagers told AAN that militia commanders sought to force locals to send their youngsters to fight alongside them against the Taleban.***

*The local government's ability to ensure rule of law in these 'fiefdoms' has been very limited. In most instances local officials (governor, police chief, provincial council and Wolesi Jirga members) seem to have intentionally not interfered, based on their existing factional and political links with militia commanders. This in turn helped the insurgents gain a foothold in the districts, where in some villages locals sheltered Taleban in the hope of getting rid of pro-government militias. Speaking to AAN, an elder from Khanabad district said that although the Taleban also asked for taxes, they did so only once per year and by a single commander. He went on to say, the businessmen, shopkeepers and farmers in his district had been forced to pay tax four times to four different pro-government militia commanders (...).» Quelle: AAN, The 2015 Insurgency in the North (3): The fall and recapture of Kunduz, 16. Oktober 2015: [www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-2015-insurgency-in-the-north-3-the-fall-and-recapture-of-kunduz/](http://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-2015-insurgency-in-the-north-3-the-fall-and-recapture-of-kunduz/).*

IRIN, 7. September 2015:

*«In a bid to enforce its authority, the Afghan government has scaled up support of anti-Taliban militia – a controversial tactic since such groups have a history of mistreating civilians, according to Human Rights Watch and others.*

*Militia abuses*

*Civilians say abuses have risen alongside the growing use of militia this year, as the gunmen are extorting money, stealing property and assaulting people. The number of militia members in Khanabad district alone has increased by 1,000 this year to 3,000 armed men, according to Khanabad district governor Hayatullah Amiri.*

*Hamdullah Danishi, the deputy governor of Kunduz province, said the problem is the informal relationship between the militia and the government, which supplies militias with ammunition and food while they are fighting, but does not pay them. "We're receiving a lot of complaints," he told IRIN. "If the militia were supported by the government, they would not be forcefully collecting money and abusing people." (...)*

*'Pay or leave'*

*Shortly before he was killed in an 8 August Taliban bombing, a notorious commander named Qadeerak gathered residents of Char Tut village in Khanabad district and told them their monthly dues to the militia would rise from 500 afghanis (\$8) to 3,000 (\$50), said Najibullah, a villager who attended the meeting. "We are fighting and you live in safety. You must pay. If you don't, you must leave," Qadeerak told the villagers, according to Najibullah.» Quelle: IRIN, Abuses rise along with pro-Afghan government militias, 7. September 2015: [www.irinnews.org/feature/2015/09/07/abuses-rise-along-pro-afghan-government-militias](http://www.irinnews.org/feature/2015/09/07/abuses-rise-along-pro-afghan-government-militias).*



### 3 Rekrutierung

**Rekrutierung durch Milizkommandeure in Khanabad.** Gemäss AAN (16. Oktober 2015) berichteten viele Dorfbewohner im Distrikt Khanabad, dass Milizkommandeure versuchten, lokale Familien zu zwingen, junge Familienmitglieder aufseiten der Milizen in den Kampf gegen die Taliban zu schicken. Laut einer von AAN (28. Oktober 2014) zitierten Quelle unternahmen die Milizen starke Bemühungen zur Rekrutierung der lokalen Jugend. So mussten die meisten Haushalte in Khanabad «freiwillig» ein junges Familienmitglied auswählen und von einer lokalen Miliz rekrutieren lassen, um ihren eigenen Schutz zu sichern. Wenn sie dies nicht getan hätten, hätten sie sich selbst bewaffnen und ihr Haus Tag und Nacht schützen müssen.

**Rekruten werden von Milizkommandeuren abhängig gemacht.** Die Kommandeure versuchten laut AAN (16. Oktober 2015), sich die absolute Loyalität der jungen Rekruten zu sichern. So hätten sie diese dazu veranlasst, einen Angriff oder einen Mord durchzuführen und sich dadurch einen direkten und persönlichen Feind unter den Feinden und Rivalen des jeweiligen Kommandeurs zu schaffen. Hierbei spielten sowohl die ethnische Gruppe als auch die Familienbeziehungen des Rekruten eine Rolle. Als «Rivale» gelte bereits ein Familienmitglied des Rekruten, das versucht, diesen aus dem Einflussbereich des Kommandeurs herauszuholen. Wenn der Rekrut beispielsweise nicht zur Familie des Kommandeurs gehöre, würde dieser eine Situation schaffen, in der der Rekrut ein Mitglied seiner eigenen Familie angreifen muss, beispielsweise einen Cousin. Dies erschwere es dem Rekruten, die Gruppe des Kommandeurs zu verlassen und zu seiner Familie zurückzukehren. Wenn der Rekrut zur Familie des Kommandeurs gehöre, würde der Kommandeur ihn dazu bringen, einen seiner Rivalen zu erschiessen. Dies erschwere es dem Rekruten, sich einer rivalisierenden Gruppe anzuschliessen. Gemäss einem von AAN zitierten Lehrer begünstigte der Mangel an Arbeitsmöglichkeiten die Rekrutierung durch illegale bewaffnete Gruppen oder Aufständische.

**Berichte über Rekrutierung von Minderjährigen durch die Taliban in der Provinz Kunduz.** In einem Interview mit Al Jazeera vom 14. Oktober 2015 gab Leila Zerrougui, UN-Sonderberichterstatterin über Kinder und bewaffnete Konflikte, an, die Taliban würden Kinder rekrutieren und an der Front einsetzen. In Kunduz würden Kinder im Alter zwischen 10 und 15 Jahren eingesetzt. In der Vergangenheit habe es auch Berichte von Entführungen von Kindern und ihren Einsatz zum Legen von improvisierten Sprengsätzen und als Selbstmordattentäter gegeben. Ausserdem würden Kinder als Spione rekrutiert und riskierten, von der Gegenseite getötet zu werden. Ein Artikel von RFE/RL vom 31. Juli 2016 wird berichtet, dass die meisten der Minderjährigen, welche die Taliban in der Provinz Kunduz rekrutierten, im zwischen 15 und 18 Jahre alt gewesen seien. RFE/RL zitiert einen angeblichen Sprecher der Taliban, der die Rekrutierung von Teenagern abstrikt und angab, dass nur Kämpfer, die über 20 Jahre alt sind, in die Trainingslager der Region aufgenommen würden.

**Rekrutierung und Ausbildung in *madrasas*.** Am 17. Februar 2016 berichtete *Human Rights Watch* (HRW), in Kunduz und anderen nördlichen Provinzen gebe es bereits seit spätestens 2012 *madrasas* (Religionsschulen), die von den Taliban geleitet und nach und nach zur Indoktrinierung und militärischen Ausbildung von Kin-

dern genutzt wurden. Zuvor seien von Taliban-Kommandeuren ausgewählte Jungen zum militärischen Training nach Nordwaziristan in Pakistan geschickt worden. Dies sei weiterhin der Fall, allerdings würden die Taliban ihre zukünftigen Kämpfer nun vermehrt vor Ort in der Provinz Kunduz ausbilden.

Laut HRW (17. Februar 2016) weiteten die Taliban im Jahr 2015 die Rekrutierung von Kindern als Kämpfer wegen der Intensivierung der Operationen der Taliban gegen Sicherheitskräfte der Regierung aus. Auch RFE/RL (31. Juli 2016) berichtet von *madrasas* in der Provinz Kunduz, in denen zu diesem Zeitpunkt laut Vertretern der afghanischen Regierung Kinder und Teenager in Vorbereitung auf die geplante Rückeroberung der Provinzhauptstadt Kunduz als Kämpfer ausgebildet wurden.

Rekrutierung und Ausbildung findet laut HRW (17. Februar 2016) nach Altersgruppen statt. Ab einem Alter von sechs Jahren würden die Jungen während bis zu sieben Jahren indoktriniert. Im Alter von 13 Jahren hätten sie bereits militärische Techniken wie die Benutzung von Feuerwaffen und die Herstellung und Anwendung von improvisierten Sprengkörpern erlernt. Danach würden diese ausgebildeten Kindersoldaten in spezifische Talibangruppen eingeführt.

Mit dem Aufbau von Ausbildungszentren in *madrasas* in eroberten Teilen der Provinz Kunduz nahm gemäss HRW (17. Februar 2016) auch die Rekrutierung von Kindersoldaten zu. Die *madrasas* der Taliban seien attraktiv für viele arme Familien, da die Taliban alle Kosten übernähmen und Essen und Kleidung für die Kinder bereitstellten. In einigen Fällen zahlten sie sogar Geld an Familien, die ihre Kinder in *madrasas* schickten. Laut *Pajhwok* (25. Januar 2016) kontrollierten die Taliban 300 der fast 500 *madrasas* in der Provinz Kunduz. In Teilen von Khanabad und anderen Distrikten rekrutierten sie auf diese Weise Kindersoldaten.

**Nur eingeschränkte Rekrutierung durch Daesh/IS im Nordosten Afghanistans wegen der starken Präsenz der Taliban.** Obaid Ali, Analyst beim *Afghanistan Analysts Network*, gab am 17. August 2017 gegenüber der SFH an, dass mit dem selbst proklamierten «Islamischen Staat» (IS/Daesh) assoziierte Gruppen wegen der starken Präsenz der Taliban im Nordosten Afghanistans (Provinzen Baghlan, Kunduz und Takhar) nur sehr eingeschränkt rekrutieren können. Sie würden dies grösstenteils im Untergrund tun und nur vertrauenswürdige junge Männer hauptsächlich über Familien- und Freundschaftsnetzwerke kontaktieren.

AAN, 28. Oktober 2014:

*«The recruitment process*

*What is notable about these groups is that while some are led by former mujahedin or 'jihadi' commanders, others are led by men far too young to have a jihadi background. A local journalist argued that in the chaotic environment of Khanabad all the local commanders feel a strong need to protect themselves and their interests with as large a group of armed supporters as possible. The business traveler cited above stated that **most of the residences in Khanabad have to 'voluntarily' offer a young member of their families to a local armed group in order to secure their own protection. Otherwise, they have to arm themselves and protect their house, night and day.***

*The result is the heavy recruitment of local youth and an increasingly complex situation as commanders seek to secure the absolute loyalty of recruits. The main tactic used by commanders is to have the recruit create an immediate and personal enemy from among the enemies and rivals of the commander by carrying out an attack or killing. Here the commander takes into account both ethnicity and family relations, as the recruit's family could be considered a 'rival' if they attempt to pull their son or brother away from the commanders' influence. For example, if the new recruit is not related to the family of the commander, then the commander will create a situation where the recruit has to attack a member of his family, such as a cousin, making it harder for the recruit to return to leave the commanders group and return to his own family (...). If the recruit is a relative of the commander's family, then the commander pushes him to shoot someone from amongst the commander's rivals. The alternate use of these recruitment tactics ensures the commander's control over his young recruits. First of all, the recruit will not be able to join other parties because of the killing, and secondly he cannot return to his family because of the newly created intra-family enmity.*

*A teacher of the district center interviewed in June 2013 expressed his deep concern over the situation of the youth in the district:*

*Insecurity in the district is due to the lack of job opportunities [...] youth are being used by political groups [...] the government should pay more attention to this issue, as unemployment rates will increase, more youth will join illegal armed groups or insurgents.»* Quelle: AAN, Security in Kunduz Worsening Further: The case of Khanabad, 28. Oktober 2014:  
[www.afghanistan-analysts.org/security-in-kunduz-worsening-further-the-case-of-khanabad/](http://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/security-in-kunduz-worsening-further-the-case-of-khanabad/).

Al Jazeera, 14. Oktober 2015:

*«Al Jazeera: How did the Taliban recruit and use children in their frontline operations, in Kunduz?*

*Leila Zerrougui: The information that we have received is that **children are not only recruited and used by the Taliban in the frontline**, something that is completely unacceptable, but also that the number of children killed and maimed in the conflict was also very high. The access to these areas are very difficult but what we know so far is that at least 10 children have been killed in the Kunduz conflict and 53 have been injured.*

*Al Jazeera: What kinds of violations against children are we talking about since the beginning of the Taliban offensive in Kunduz?*

*Leila Zerrougui: We have seen the Taliban recruiting children before for a long time. **The information we have received from Kunduz is that children as young as 10 were forcibly recruited and have been used in fighting in Kunduz. In the past, we also had information of abduction of children and their use particularly for planting IEDs and as suicide bombers. They are also recruited as spies where they ran the risk of being killed by the other side. In Kunduz, children between***

*the ages of 10 and 15 were used by the Taliban and dozens of them were deployed according to eyewitnesses, but we cannot confirm the exact number for now.»* Quelle: Al Jazeera, Q&A: The Taliban's child soldiers in Kunduz, 14. Oktober 2015:

[www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/10/qa-taliban-child-soldiers-kunduz-151014110739457.html](http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/10/qa-taliban-child-soldiers-kunduz-151014110739457.html).

HRW, 17. Februar 2016:

*«Taliban forces in Afghanistan have added scores of children to their ranks since mid-2015 in violation of the international prohibition on the use of child soldiers, Human Rights Watch said today.*

*New Human Rights Watch research shows that the Taliban have been training and deploying children for various military operations including the production and planting of improvised explosive devices (IED). In Kunduz province, the Taliban have increasingly used madrasas, or Islamic religious schools, to provide military training to children between the ages of 13 and 17, many of whom have been deployed in combat. (...) Despite Taliban claims that they only enlist fighters who have achieved “mental and physical maturity,” and do not use “boys with no beards” in military operations, some of the children recruited from madrasas in Kunduz, Takhar, and Badakhshan provinces are 13 or younger. The Taliban have previously denied “the use of children and adolescents in Jihadic Operations,” but its deployment of individuals under the age of 18 violates international law applicable in Afghanistan and in cases involving children under 15 is a war crime.*

*Kunduz residents and analysts say that the increase in recruitment and deployment of child fighters coincided with the Taliban’s major offensive in northern Afghanistan that began in April 2015. Human Rights Watch interviews with activists and analysts indicate that the Taliban-run madrasas have been functioning in Kunduz, as well as other northern provinces, since at least 2012. As the Taliban made substantial inroads in 2013-2014, gaining ground in Kunduz’s Chahardara and Dasht-e Archi districts, they gained more influence over education in the province. Taliban commanders increasingly used madrasas not only for indoctrination, but also for military training of children. Previously, Taliban commanders sent boys selected for military training to North Waziristan in Pakistan, where despite Pakistan’s military operations, the Taliban operates freely in large swathes of territory. While such training still occurs, the Taliban has solidified its control over at least three districts in Kunduz and residents and analysts told Human Rights Watch that the group is carrying out more of the military training locally.*

*The Taliban recruit and train children in age-specific stages. Boys begin indoctrination as young as six years old, and continue to study religious subjects under Taliban teachers for up to seven years. According to relatives of boys recruited by the Taliban, by the time they are 13, Taliban-educated children have learned military skills including use of firearms, and the production and*

**deployment of IEDs. Taliban teachers then introduce those trained child soldiers to specific Taliban groups in that district. (...)**

**The establishment of training centers in madrasas in the Taliban's expanded zone of control in Kunduz also led to increases in child soldier recruitment. Kunduz residents told Human Rights Watch that the Taliban had recruited and deployed more than 100 children from Chahardara district alone in 2015.**

**Because the Taliban begin the indoctrination of children from an early age, they are easily persuaded to fight.** Relatives of child soldiers in Kunduz told Human Rights Watch that the Taliban target children because it is easy to convince them of the righteousness of jihad, and because they are at an age where they do not feel responsible for providing for a family and so are easily persuaded to take on dangerous tasks. In general, children are not recruited by force. However parents who have tried to retrieve their children are usually unable to do so because the Taliban claim that the boys are of age, or are committed to jihad regardless of their age.

**The Taliban madrasas attract many poor families because the Taliban cover their expenses and provide food and clothing for the children. In some cases they offer cash to families for sending their boys to the madrasas.** An expert on Kunduz told Human Rights Watch that traditionally, even before the Taliban established madrasas in these areas, rural and village families sent at least one son to the local madrasa because of the prestige associated with the status of becoming a mullah (someone educated in the basics of Islamic law). In the cases of child soldiers Human Rights Watch investigated, some boys attended the madrasas in the early morning hours and then attended government schools later in the day. Other boys who had been recruited attended the madrasas full time.» Quelle: HRW, Afghanistan: Taliban Child Soldier Recruitment Surges, 17. Februar 2016:  
[www.hrw.org/news/2016/02/17/afghanistan-taliban-child-soldier-recruitment-surges](http://www.hrw.org/news/2016/02/17/afghanistan-taliban-child-soldier-recruitment-surges).

Pajhwok, 25. Januar 2016:

**«Local officials say more than 300 schools are under Taliban's control in northern Kunduz province, where the insurgents recruit students for fighting. However, the militant group vehemently denies recruiting schoolchildren as fighters. It says children's recruitment as fighters is forbidden under Taliban's policy and the Islamic Shariah. (...) Kunduz officials explain of the 497 schools in the province, more than 300 are located in areas under Taliban's control. The fighters mark absent the teachers and students who do not come in time. A long absence may translate into a teacher's sacking or a student's rustication. Acting Governor Hamdullah Danishi admitted the Taliban even influenced transfers and employment of teachers. Without giving details of the areas under militant control, he confirmed the rebels were active just one kilometre from Kunduz City.**

**In parts of Imam Sahib, Dasht-i-Archi, Qala-i-Zal, Khanabad and Chahar Dara districts, the guerrilla presence had been taking a heavy toll on education. "The Taliban train students against the government and recruit them for fighting. Our elders should make a decision on the issue," he demanded. Danishi revealed the militants were recruiting students from Nangarhar and Kunduz provinces -- a practice**

*that must be stopped forthwith. A resident of Chahar Dara district, who requested not to be named, said the rebels had devoted a specific time to training students on how to use different kinds of weapons at Basos School. (...) **But the Taliban rejected the allegations they are recruiting students from schools under their control.***

Quelle: Pajhwok, Taliban control 300 Kunduz schools, recruit students, 25. Januar 2016:

[www.pajhwok.com/en/2016/01/25/taliban-control-300-kunduz-schools-recruit-students](http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2016/01/25/taliban-control-300-kunduz-schools-recruit-students).

RFE/RL, 31. Juli 2016:

*«Afghan officials say the Taliban are using such madrasahs across Kunduz to train children and teenagers in an attempt to recapture the provincial capital, which the insurgents overran and controlled for nearly a week last September. (...) Another police commander, who requested anonymity, said the young fighters are so indoctrinated that they become some of the most diehard fighters Afghan forces encounter. **Most, he said, are 15 to 18 years old.** (...) Another police commander, who also requested anonymity, said most Taliban training camps operate in Dasht-e Archi and Chardara -- two agricultural districts surrounding Kunduz city. They served as a launch pad for the Taliban's foray into the provincial capital last year. (...) The Taliban's drive to train young fighters even goes against the Taliban rule book, which specifically forbids field commanders from recruiting fighters before their beards are fully grown, which usually happens between the 17 and 20 year of age. **Zabihullah Mujahid, a purported Taliban spokesman, rejected claims that the Taliban are recruiting teenagers. He said they do have training camps in the region but that they only admit fighters older than 20.**»* Quelle: RFE/RL, Taliban Recruit Religious Students To Retake Kunduz, 31. Juli 2016:

<https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-kunduz-fighting/27890369.html>.

#### 4 Verfolgung von Familienangehörigen

**Verfolgung von Familienangehörigen von Polizisten und anderen der Regierung nahestehenden Personen.** Laut den UNHCR-Richtlinien zu Afghanistan vom 19. April 2016 gehören Familienangehörige von Polizisten zu den Personen, die von regierungsfeindlichen Gruppen verfolgt werden, einschliesslich durch Töten, Anwendung von Gewalt, Entführungen und Schikanen.

Gemäss einer E-Mail-Auskunft von Obaid Ali, Analyst beim *Afghanistan Analysts Network*, vom 17. August 2017 an die SFH verfolgen die Taliban oft Familienmitglieder von Regierungsvertretern. Davon betroffen seien meist Familienangehörige von höheren Regierungsangestellten wie Polizeidirektoren, Gouverneure, Generalstaatsanwälte und Mitglieder von Provinzräten. Auch Familienmitglieder von Frauenrechtsaktivistinnen seien betroffen. Von niedrigeren Regierungsangestellten würden die Taliban verlangen, dass sie ihren Familienmitgliedern verbieten, bei der Afghanischen Nationalen Polizei, der Afghanischen Nationalen Armee, der Afghanischen Lokalen Polizei, Pro-Regierungs-Milizen oder anderen Regierungsinstitutionen zu arbeiten.

UNHCR, 19. April 2016:

*«Regierungsfeindliche Kräfte (AGEs) greifen Berichten zufolge systematisch und gezielt Zivilisten an, die tatsächlich oder vermeintlich die afghanische Regierung, die afghanische Zivilgesellschaft und die internationale Gemeinschaft in Afghanistan, einschließlich der internationalen Streitkräfte und der internationalen humanitären Hilfs- und Entwicklungsakteure, unterstützen bzw. mit diesen verbunden sind. (...)*

*Die afghanischen Sicherheitskräfte, insbesondere Mitglieder der afghanischen nationalen Polizei, werden zunehmend in gezielten Kampagnen angegriffen. Seit dem weitgehenden Rückzug der internationalen Streitkräfte im Jahr 2014 gerieten Polizeistützpunkte und Kontrollstellen zunehmend ins Visier regierungsfeindlicher Kräfte. Polizisten der afghanischen nationalen Polizei (ANP) wurden sowohl im Dienst als auch außerhalb des Dienstes angegriffen. (...)*

***Regierungsfeindliche Kräfte haben Berichten zufolge Familienangehörige von Personen mit den oben angeführten Profilen als Vergeltungsmaßnahme und gemäß dem Prinzip der Sippenhaft angegriffen. Insbesondere wurden Verwandte, darunter Frauen und Kinder, von Regierungsmitarbeitern und Mitgliedern der afghanischen nationalen Sicherheitskräfte Opfer von Schikanen, Entführungen, Gewalt und Tötungen.»*** Quelle: UNHCR – The UN Refugee Agency, UNHCR-Richtlinien zur Feststellung des internationalen Schutzbedarfs afghanischer Asylsuchender, 19. April 2016, S. 38, 39, 41-42, 47:  
[www.ecoi.net/file\\_upload/90\\_1471846055\\_unhcr-20160419-afg-richtlinien-de.pdf](http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/90_1471846055_unhcr-20160419-afg-richtlinien-de.pdf).